

Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan

Summary

By mid-December 2023, Rapid Support Forces (RSF), had secured control of four out of five Darfur states, including strategic cities, supply routes and border areas. RSF captured Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) headquarters in South Darfur (Nyala on 26 October), Central Darfur (Zalingei on 31 October), West Darfur (Ardamatta on 4 November) and East Darfur (Ed Daien on 22 November). This operation was supervised by Abdelrahim Dagalo (RSF deputy-chief). Already in the first phase of the conflict (April – July 2023), RSF had seized large parts of Darfur, including important SAF bases in localities such as Kutum, Kabkabiya (North Darfur) and Am Dafok (South Darfur). SAF retained a presence only in North Darfur state, in particular their headquarters in El Fasher, which RSF refrained from attacking after informal negotiations with the Darfurian armed movements there.

As the RSF advanced, violence against civilians swept through Darfur. In West Darfur (El Geneina, Sirba, Murne, and Masteri) RSF and allied militias targeted the Masalit community in particular. The RSF allied militias systematically violated international humanitarian law. Some of these violations may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. The RSF and allied militias targeted IDP gathering sites, civilian neighbourhoods, and medical facilities, and committed sexual violence against women and girls. In El Geneina alone between 10,000 and 15,000 people were killed. SAF were not only unable to protect civilians but also used aerial bombing and heavy shelling in urban areas in El Fasher, Nyala and El Daein. These actions by the warring parties caused a large-scale humanitarian crisis.

RSF's takeover of Darfur relied on three lines of support: the Arab allied communities; dynamic and complex financial networks; and new military supply lines running through Chad, Libya, and South Sudan.

While both SAF and RSF engaged in widespread recruitment drives across Darfur from late 2022 onwards, the RSF were more successful. They harnessed substantial support among Arab communities, in particular in South and West Darfur. The war crystallized a feeling of common Arab identity amongst Arab communities of Darfur (and Kordofan), temporarily suspending old internal rivalries. Native leaders were further motivated by RSF's offerings of cars, money, and military ranks. The Arab communities provided RSF with the manpower and local knowledge crucial to quickly capture the main cities and supply routes across Darfur.

Complex financial networks established by RSF before and during the war enabled it to acquire weapons, pay salaries, fund media campaigns, lobby, and buy the support of other political and armed groups. RSF invested large proceeds from their pre-war gold business in several industries, creating a network of as many as 50 companies. RSF senior members and their associates owned and controlled several of these companies in the region. Al Khaleej Bank became instrumental in financing RSF, receiving a USD 50 million transfer from the Central Bank in March 2023.

With this money, the RSF developed new supply lines of military equipment and fuel through Eastern Chad, Libya and South Sudan. From July onwards, the RSF deployed several types of heavy and/or sophisticated weapons including Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), howitzers, multiple-rocket launchers and anti-aircraft weapons such as MANPADS. This new RSF firepower had a massive impact on the balance of forces, both in Darfur and other regions of Sudan. New heavy artillery enabled RSF to swiftly take over Nyala and El Geneina, while their new anti-aircraft devices helped counter SAF's main asset, its air force. Meanwhile, SAF could not replenish its Darfur garrisons with any meaningful military supplies, as RSF had taken control of most portions of the road between Kosti and El Fasher, SAF's main supply route from Khartoum and Port Sudan.

In the meantime, pressure on the Darfurian armed movements to side with either SAF or RSF triggered divisions between and within the movements. While initially most armed movements publicly adopted a position of neutrality, this stance changed dramatically on 16 November, when several key leaders of armed movements, including Minni Minawi (Chairman of Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLA/MM)) and Gibril Ibrahim (JEM Chairman) declared support for SAF. However, this

fragmentation within movements was yet to have any effect as forces on the ground refused to join the fighting.

While Darfur was experiencing its worst violence since 2005, various regional and international actors attempted to mediate between RSF and SAF. The combination of an excess of mediation tracks, the entrenched positions of the warring parties, and competing regional interests meant that these peace efforts had yet to stop the war, bring political settlement or address the humanitarian crisis.

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I. Introduction

1. In its paragraph 2 of resolution 2676 (2023), the Security Council requested the Panel of Experts on the Sudan to provide it with a final report no later than 13 January 2024. In the present report, the Panel outlined its findings and investigations since the beginning of its mandate on 12 March 2023.
2. Due to the security situation, the Panel was unable to visit Darfur. However, the Panel held meetings and conducted telephone interviews with a number of interlocutors, including the Government of Sudan (GoS), the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the Darfurian armed movements, both signatories and non-signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA), representatives of civil society, including Internally Displaced Persons (IDP), refugees, victims and eye-witnesses of violence, women’s organizations and traditional authorities. Additionally, the Panel met with representatives from different UN agencies and programmes, the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) and the diplomatic community. During its mandate, the Panel also conducted visits to Chad, Ethiopia, Egypt, France, Kenya, Qatar, South Sudan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Uganda.
3. The Panel worked in full conformity with the best practices and methods recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (see S/2006/997). The Panel gathered and consulted primary source documents, photographic evidence, and satellite imagery. In addition to the above, the Panel gathered information through desk research, different media, and other open sources. Information contained in the present report was triangulated from a variety of the above-mentioned sources.

II. Conflict dynamics in Darfur

A. Overview

4. The conflict which started on 15 April in Khartoum between SAF and RSF spread to Darfur by the end of that month. In a first phase of the conflict in Darfur (April – July), RSF took control of large swathes of territory, including important SAF bases in localities such as Kutum, Kabkabiya (North Darfur) and Am Dafok (South Darfur). However, SAF maintained a presence in Darfur, in particular at the headquarters of their divisions in the capitals of the five states of the region. In El Geneina (West Darfur), clashes in May – June between RSF and the Sudanese Alliance armed group resulted in large-scale attacks on civilians, the Masalit population in particular, by elements of RSF and local Arab militias (See Chapter VI). During this initial phase of the conflict, RSF’s efforts focused on Khartoum with the aim to drive SAF out the city. Meanwhile, several JPA signatory movements formed a joint force, which escorted humanitarian convoys to El Fasher.
5. In a second phase of the conflict, in Darfur, which began in August, RSF launched a large-scale military campaign aimed at taking full control of this region. Strengthened by new weapons supply lines (see Chapter IV) and intensified recruitment amongst local Arab communities (see paragraphs 28, 29, 30, 105,106,107), RSF successively captured SAF headquarters in South Darfur (Nyala on 26 October), Central Darfur (Zalingei on 31 October), West Darfur (Ardamatta on 4 November) and East Darfur (Ed Daien on 22 November) (see table 1: Chronology of key political developments against military operations in Darfur capitals). SAF retained a presence only in North Darfur state, in particular at their headquarters in El Fasher. RSF refrained from attacking this remaining SAF base after informal negotiations with the Darfurian armed movements, who had a massive presence in North Darfur (see paragraphs 13-18). Abdelrahim Dagalo, RSF deputy commander, played a pivotal role in the RSF campaign in Darfur, personally supervising the military operations in the five states since October.

Table 1: Chronology of key political developments against military operations in Darfur capitals

Date	Political event	RSF Military operations in Darfur capitals
24 April		RSF and allied militias attacked El Geneina
11 May	RSF and SAF signed the Jeddah Declaration. The parties made commitments to protect civilians, respect international humanitarian law, and allow humanitarian operations	
14 June		The Wali of West Darfur, Khamis Abakar, was killed in El Geneina
19 June		RSF and allied militias took over El Geneina. Former deputy Wali, Tijani Karshom, became the de-facto Wali
21 June	The Jeddah talks were adjourned	
21-24 October	Civil society and armed groups signatories to the JPA meeting in Addis	RSF attacked SAF’s 16 th division in Nyala

	Adaba, Ethiopia. Creation of Taqqadam civilian coalition led by former Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok	
25-26 October	JPA signatory movements met in Juba. The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army-Transitional Council (SLA/TC), and the Gathering of Sudan Liberation Forces (GSLF) are requested to declare their alliance to SAF and move to Port Sudan. Requirements were refused by both groups.	
26 October	Resumption of the Jeddah talks	RSF took over SAF's 16 th Division in Nyala
31 October		RSF took over SAF's 21 st Division in Zalingei
1 November		RSF attacked Ardamatta
3 November	Al-Hadi Idris, chair of SLA/TC, is expelled from the Sovereignty Council	
4 November	New Jeddah commitment was signed. The parties reaffirmed the Jeddah Declarations signed on 11 May. In addition, between others, the parties agreed to participate in a joint humanitarian forum to guarantee humanitarian access	RSF took over SAF's 15 th Division in Ardamatta
16 November	Minni Minawi (SLM/MM) and Gibril Ibrahim (JEM) declared their public support to SAF	
17 November	Al-Hadi Idris and Al-Tahir Hajar declared their neutrality	
20 November	GSLF deputy chairman, Abdallah Yahya, declared his alliance with SAF	
21 November	Al-Tahir Hajar was expelled from the Sovereignty Council	
22 November		SAF's 20 th Division in El Dein surrendered to RSF

6. RSF's military campaign in Darfur elicited support from various Arab communities, including through recruitment and coordination. The backing of these Arab communities provided essential manpower, resources, and local knowledge, increasing the overall military capability of RSF. This support proved instrumental for RSF to gain control over strategic cities, trade routes and border areas. Such support and coordination were observed in El Geneina (see Chapter VI) and Nyala (see Chapter VII).

B. Darfurian armed groups: shattered neutrality and fragmentation

7. The overall conflict between SAF and RSF put pressure on the Darfurian armed movements to choose a side. This conundrum triggered divisions between and within the movements. Initially, most of the armed movements publicly adopted a position of neutrality. Exceptions were the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) branch of Mostafa Tambor, which from the beginning supported SAF against RSF in Central Darfur, and the Sudanese Alliance (SA), led by West Darfur Governor Khamis Abdallah Abkar, whose forces have engaged in fighting alongside civilians in El Geneina against RSF and allied militias since June.
8. However, this situation changed dramatically on 16 November when several key leaders of armed movements, including Minni Minawi (Chairman of Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLA/MM)) and Gibril Ibrahim (JEM Chairman) declared their support for SAF. At the time of writing, this change in their official positions had no direct consequence on the ground, as these movements' forces were against joining the fighting. Indeed, the movements' field commanders, including Major General Jabir Ishaq from SLM/MM and Major General Hamid Iddris Gazam from JEM, negotiated an informal agreement on the ground with their RSF counterparts to avoid conflict in North Darfur.¹ In parallel, several leaders of the movements, including Al-Hadi Idris and Minawi, held informal talks with RSF leaders in neighbouring countries to resolve tensions.²

- ***Split within JEM***

9. On 14 August, JEM split into two groups who disagreed over the movement's position in the war. In July, JEM suspended several key leaders, including Suleiman Sandal, who oversaw JEM's security arrangements, and Ahmed Lissan Tugod, chief peace negotiator, because they had met Abdelrahim Dagalo in early July in N'Djamena, Chad. The ousted leaders disagreed with Gibril Ibrahim's alignment with SAF. This split was yet to have any significant effect on JEM's military force in Darfur.

- ***Dismissal of SLA/TC and GSLF leaders from the Sovereignty Council***

10. In early November, Al-Hadi Idris (SLA/TC) and Al-Tahir Hajar (GSLF) were ousted from the Sovereignty Council by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. The removal was prompted by their refusal to relocate the movements' headquarters to Port Sudan and publicly endorse SAF. During the South Sudan mediation meeting in October, leaders of the SLA/TC and the GLSF were invited to discuss the role of JPA signatories in resolving the conflict. They however concluded that the intention behind the meeting was for them to publicly align with SAF and to condemn RSF, which they refused to do.
11. As with JEM, the conflict led to internal differences within GSLF. While the faction led by Al-Tahir Hajar was close to RSF, the factions led by GLSF Deputy Chairman, Abdallah Yahya, and Abdallah Jana, Head of the military force, publicly announced their support for SAF in November 2023.³

- ***Abdallah Banda's support for SAF***

¹ <https://twitter.com/RSFSudan/status/1725186152930414730?s=20>.

² See for instance <https://sudantribune.com/article280309/>.

³ https://twitter.com/SudanTribune_EN/status/1726928165510041912.

12. The Gathering of the Sudanese Justice and Equality Forces (GSJEF), a Darfurian armed group based in Libya and led by Abdallah Banda, publicly announced in November its decision to join the SAF against the RSF.⁴ However, at the time of writing, this statement had no effect on the military balance on the ground, as Banda, who is wanted by the International Criminal Court, and his fighters, remained in Libya.

C. North Darfur: fragile status quo⁵

13. Conflict dynamics in North Darfur differed from the rest of the region, as this state was a stronghold of the Darfurian armed movements signatory to the JPA. To date, it was the only state not fully controlled by RSF.
14. Amid the initial violence, local authorities in the state's capital El Fasher, under the leadership of Wali Nimir Mohamed Abdul Rahman, brokered a ceasefire agreement on 20 April, dividing the city between SAF, RSF and the Darfurian armed movements signatories to the JPA. This accord allowed SAF and RSF to maintain positions on the west and east sides of the city, respectively, with a central area designated as a buffer zone under the control of the joint force by the armed movements.
15. Local authorities and commanders of the armed movements carefully managed incidents. For instance, on 26 May, RSF breached the ceasefire while entering the town to loot the local branch of the Central Bank. However, this attack did not lead to full-fledged fighting. The signatory movements refrained from reacting, demonstrating their eagerness to avoid fighting.
16. The security situation in North Darfur became more complex after the Sudan Liberation Army Abdul Wahid al-Nur (SLA/AW) faction, led by chief of staff Yusif Ahmed Yusif "Karjakola", returned to North Darfur from Libya in late July, with 300 cars and several thousand fighters. These forces were stationed in several areas, including in Tawila (North Darfur), and Jebel Marra (in the localities of Fanga, Argo Dali and Gorlabang) to protect the local Fur community. At the time of writing, the agenda of this force was unclear but it has refrained from taking sides between SAF and RSF.

⁴ <https://sudantribune.com/article279593/>.

⁵ Interviews with members of the Darfurian armed movements, April-December 2023.



Karjakola, SAF's lieutenant-colonel Al-Sadiq Foka, and Deputy Chair of SLA/TC, Salah Adam Tor "Rasas" in El Fasher. Source: Panel source in El Fasher. Photo taken on 24 November 2023

17. However, local tensions increased in late August around the issue of the humanitarian convoys escorted by JPA signatory movements from Port Sudan to El Fasher. RSF accused the armed groups of using these convoys to provide military supplies to SAF in Darfur. The situation was further complicated by Minawi's meeting with General al-Burhan in Port Sudan on 3 September, contributing to growing mistrust between Minawi and RSF.
18. Tensions increased further in October, when RSF, following Nyala's takeover, amassed forces around El Fasher under the command of Abdelrahim Dagalo, threatening to attack SAF's military base and take over the city. SAF responded with air strikes targeting RSF positions on 31 October and 1 November. The declaration of support for SAF by some JPA signatories heightened tensions further, but negotiations on the ground between RSF and the movements cooled the situation down.

III. Ethnic-based recruitment: "Militianisation" dynamics

19. Since late 2022, tensions between SAF and RSF had been building up, exacerbated by the political discussions around the Framework Agreement.⁶ Since then, both sides were preparing for the worst by engaging in extensive ethnic-based recruitments in Darfur. Both warring parties continued, and intensified, this recruitment drive after the war broke out. They also relied on local armed militias assembled on a community basis, which they mobilized, logistically supported and used as auxiliary forces. These actions accelerated the "militianisation" of Darfurian society and the dissemination of weapons within communities. These factors will likely further destabilize the region.

⁶ Signed in December 2022 by the military component of the Government (SAF + RSF) and several political parties and supported by the UN and the African Union, the Framework Agreement established a 24-month transition aimed at the establishment of a civilian-led government.

A. Preparation for the war

- *SAF*
20. In the months leading up to the conflict, SAF sought to forge alliances with traditional chiefs from non-Arab Darfuri communities. They specifically targeted those that faced ongoing issues with Arabs and the RSF, such as the Fur and Masalit. SAF attempted to bolster its forces with their support.
 21. In February 2023, General al-Burhan and other high-ranking officers held meetings in Khartoum with high-level native leaders from the Fur community, as confirmed by various Fur leaders involved in these meetings. During the discussions, an understanding was reached, wherein SAF would recruit several thousand Fur youth to be deployed in Fur areas within Darfur, serving as protection for the Fur community, implicitly against Arabs and RSF. Subsequent to this agreement, native Fur leaders began compiling lists of community members, including former SLA/AW fighters, who were to train with SAF. However, this recruitment process had not been completed by the time the war started, and subsequently came to a halt.
 22. As tensions between SAF and RSF escalated in the months preceding the conflict, SAF sought to recruit former members of Musa Hilal's dissolved Border Guards force, which had been integrated into RSF in 2017. SAF also considered re-forming the Border Guards force. Meetings were held between Hilal and SAF leaders, including General Hassan Bileil, deputy director of Military Intelligence, to explore these possibilities. Utilizing former Border Guards officers like Musa Omer Hilal, Hilal's nephew, SAF assembled several hundred fighters in Jedid Elseil (near El Fasher) and Domaya (near Nyala) in March 2023 for military training. Most recruits hailed from Hilal's Mahamid clan of the Rezeigat community, as SAF capitalized on the personal rivalry between Hilal and Hemetti, the latter himself being from the Mahariya clan of Rezeigat. A few hundred of these recruits supported SAF in North Darfur, engaging in clashes against RSF in El Fasher and Kabkabiya. Hilal's recruitment efforts were thwarted by SAF's limited financial resources, according to sources in his Sudanese Revolutionary Awakening Council (SRAC) group.
- *RSF*
23. At the beginning of 2023, RSF launched a large-scale recruitment campaign in Darfur, with a focus on South and West Darfur, particularly among local Arab communities (see Chapter VI and Chapter VII).

B. Ongoing Recruitment⁷

24. Recruitment drives by the two warring parties intensified after the war broke out. They were ongoing at the time of writing.
- *SAF*
25. In order to match RSF surge in Darfur since August, SAF increased its efforts to recruit new fighters and auxiliary forces. In North Darfur, SAF used JEM/Dabajo, a former rebel group which signed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) in 2013 and was subsequently integrated into SAF, to recruit from the Zaghawa community. After the head of the movement, Bakhit Dabajo, himself an SAF Major General, travelled to Port Sudan and met General al-Burhan in early September, SAF's 16th division, based in El Fasher, recruited and graduated about 4,000 fighters.⁸ Many of these were recruited through JEM/Dabajo's networks, according to sources in the group. This recruitment effort capitalized on the antagonism between the Zaghawa community and Arabs, which

⁷ This section is based on in-person and phone interviews with a broad range of interlocutors, including native leaders and relevant armed groups.

⁸ See here for one of the graduation ceremonies, in October 2023:

<https://www.facebook.com/share/v/5ahvxZALeZdWHk5w/?mibextid=KsPBc6>.

escalated following threats by RSF to take control of North Darfur, which the Zaghawa consider their stronghold.

26. According to various sources in North Darfur, SAF also garnered support from some paramilitary forces formed during former president Al-Bashir's regime. In particular, in El Fasher, it coordinated with elements of the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) who were recruited by Osman Kibir from his Berti community when he was Governor of North Darfur (2011-2015). These elements are known as "Kibir's militia".⁹
27. Following the events in El Geneina in June, there was a rapprochement between SAF and representatives of the Masalit community. Several native, political and military leaders of the community, including Masalit leaders of the Sudanese Alliance armed group, visited Port Sudan. There they had meetings with SAF representatives and Government authorities to discuss military cooperation against RSF and the recruitment of Masalit into SAF. However, mobilizing or supporting armed Masalit in eastern Chad appeared very complicated to SAF, who did not have access to Chad. Instead, SAF focused on recruiting within the Masalit community of Gedaref state (East Sudan).¹⁰
 - *RSF*
28. The war crystallized a feeling of common Arab identity amongst Arab communities of Darfur (and Kordofan), temporarily suspending old internal rivalries such as the tensions between Mahamid and Mahariya, and members of these communities largely coalesced in support of RSF.¹¹ Based on Arab solidarity, and on substantive financial means, RSF attracted various Arab armed groups and militias, including former foes.
29. In its military operations in Darfur and Khartoum, RSF relied more and more heavily on these new allies. In particular, several former commanders and dissident groups formerly aligned with RSF's rival Musa Hilal played a major role in RSF's military campaign. For example, Abdallah Hissene and Mohamed Khadam, two former Hilal's leaders in Libya who joined RSF in 2022, as well as Ali Rizkalla "Savana", a well-known former Arab rebel leader and Hilal's ally, now played a key role in RSF operations. In early September, a force constituted of several hundred fighters from various Hilal splinter groups, such as SRAC / Democratic and SRAC / Collective Leadership, arrived in Darfur from Libya. They now operate under RSF's banner in Khartoum, according to multiple sources in these groups.
30. Several commanders and factions of the Third Front/Tamazuj, a group initially closer to SAF,¹² also joined the RSF since the beginning of the fighting. These included Ahmed Adam Gouja, formerly involved in incidents against the authorities in West Darfur in 2021 – 2022. In August, Mohamed Ali Gurashi, the head of one of the leading Third Front / Tamazuj groups, himself a Rezeigat from East Darfur and previously an SAF supporter, announced his support for RSF.¹³ Amongst the Arab factions of the Sudanese Alliance armed group, most of the key leaders and commanders such as Saad Mahil, also joined RSF.

C. Proliferation of small and light weapons as a result of the "militianization" process

⁹ On the creation of the "Kibir militias", see

<https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/HSBA-WP-28-Forgotten-Darfur.pdf>

¹⁰ Interviews with several community leaders and SA leaders, N'Djamena, Chad, and by phone, July – December 2023.

¹¹ RSF fighters and allies frequently used the term « aleutaawa » (العلوة) to name the coalition of Arab communities from Darfur and Kordofan.

¹² On the origins of Third Front / Tamazuj, see Panel's final report S/2022/48, Annex 6.

¹³ <https://sudantribune.com/article276260/>.

31. The above-mentioned process fuelled large-scale proliferation of small and light weapons in Darfur. The belligerents provided weapons to the civilians supporting them, RSF to local Arab communities in particular, but also, to a lesser extent, Police to Masalit in El Geneina. During the clashes, local militias looted the arms stores of police stations, like in Nyala. The “militianization” process, in particular the distribution of weapons to local communities, fuelled an escalation in violence in several localities.
32. From June, many RSF soldiers fighting in Khartoum, in particular amongst those recruited in Darfur just before the conflict, began returning to their communities. They brought goods looted in Khartoum as well as their weapons in contravention of the current arms embargo. Armed Arabs, including RSF returnees and defectors, were then selling some of their weapons in open markets around main cities such as Nyala¹⁴ and El Geneina.¹⁵ According to local sources, assault rifles such as AK47s were available for sale in these markets for 500.000 SDG (about USD 830) while heavier machine guns such as 12.7mm were available for 2 million SDG (about USD 3,300).

D. Fragmented command-and-control

33. The warring parties’ over-reliance on independent commanders who just joined them without proper integration and training, or on new fighters recruited through ethnic networks, generated a weakening of their chain of command, with some new local commanders and forces acting independently and in pursuit of their own agenda. Resulting ill-discipline and lack of internal cohesion frequently undermined SAF and RSF’s military activities. For instance, in El Fasher, in late October, Musa Hilal’s fighters stopped supporting SAF and left SAF’s military base, following separate negotiations with RSF. Within RSF, the Panel was informed of several cases where new field commanders refused to follow the leadership’s orders.
34. RSF’s reliance on ethnic-based recruitment fuelled intercommunal violence amongst Arab communities. This was illustrated by the clashes between the Salamat and Beni Halba and the Salamat and Habaniya. In early August, conflict erupted in Kubum, 136 kilometres west of Nyala, between the Beni Halba and Salamat communities who had previously contributed to the RSF’s recruitment efforts in South Darfur. Members of both groups employed RSF-provided military equipment during this fighting. Furthermore, the Panel received reliable accounts of RSF personnel leaving Khartoum, Nyala, and Zalingei, armed and equipped with ammunition, to fight with their people in this area. Clashes between the Salamat and Beni Halba lasted until November. In November, a separate conflict between the Salamat and the Habaniya erupted. Salamat fighters accused the Habaniya of being aligned with SAF.¹⁶ The clashes, which took place mostly in Buram area (South Darfur), resulted in widespread displacement, with approximately 6,000 households seeking refuge in Buram town and neighbouring areas.

IV. Weapons supply for SAF and RSF in Darfur

35. In an initial phase of the clashes in Darfur (April – July), the advanced military equipment and weapons observed in Khartoum (Sukhoi 25, Mig 29 and Mig 24 aircrafts; attack helicopters; MANPADS; combat drones) were not seen in Darfur. The various forces (SAF, RSF, JPA signatory groups, and militias) used the easily available weapons and military equipment: 12.7mm and 14.5mm heavy machine guns, as well as ZU23 anti-aircraft guns, mounted on Landcruiser vehicles; RPGs; mortar guns; various types of rocket launchers; Soviet era BTR 80 APCs, and various types of small and light weapons.¹⁷

¹⁴ A sub-market, El Kejaik, was for instance created in the Al Mawashi market, in north of Nyala, controlled by Arabs, to sell guns and looted goods.

¹⁵ The Panel received several videos and testimonies about such “shops”.

¹⁶ In a video statement seen by the Panel, a Salamat commander accused Habaniya of having received 30 vehicles from SAF.

¹⁷ As observed by many eyewitnesses and confirmed by photo and video evidence.

36. However, since August, RSF's renewed military campaign to take control of the main cities of Darfur resulted in an escalation of military means used by both sides. RSF's surge coincided with them securing new supply routes (see paragraphs 38-49).

A. Offensive military overflights

37. Since August, SAF responded to RSF's surge in Darfur with offensive military overflights, an action prohibited by the sanctions regime. On several occasions, SAF conducted air strikes on RSF positions, with aircrafts flying from military airports outside Darfur. For instance, SAF claimed air strikes on 28 and 29 August on the RSF base of Zuruk (North Darfur).¹⁸ Since August, according to various witnesses, media reports and videos, SAF also conducted several air strikes on RSF's forces in Nyala, El Daein and El Fasher areas, sometimes using their Antonov An-32 fleet (see Chapter VII).

B. New supply lines

38. Since the outbreak of the war, SAF garrisons in Darfur could not be replenished with any meaningful military supplies, as RSF swiftly took control of most portions of the road between Kosti and El Fasher, SAF's main supply route from Khartoum and Port Sudan to Darfur. In early September, some RSF members and sympathizers accused SAF of bringing military supplies to their El Fasher military base by using the humanitarian convoys coming from Port Sudan, in collusion with the armed movements escorting the convoys, SLA/MM in particular. While several Panel's sources in the movements acknowledged this was likely, these supplies were too few and limited to alter the conflict dynamics.

- e war, and in parti 39. On the other hand, since the beginning of th
were able to secure new supply lines to and through Darfur for weapons, vehicles and logistics. According to eyewitnesses and videos, in their increased military campaign in Darfur since August, the RSF used several types of heavy and/or sophisticated weapons which they were not using there before. This included Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV), howitzers, multiple-rocket launchers and anti-aircraft weapons such as MANPADS, observed in Nyala, El Fasher and El Geneina.
40. This new RSF firepower had a massive impact on the balance of forces on the ground, both in Darfur and in other regions. New RSF heavy artillery items played a major role in their capture of Nyala and El Geneina (see Chapter VI and Chapter VII), according to various local sources, including in SAF, while new anti-aircraft devices helped RSF counter SAF's main asset, its air force. For example, in October, according to official statements, various local sources and videos, the RSF shot down an SAF Antonov in the Nyala area. In a video of the RSF crew which shot down the aircraft, the Panel identified a MANPADS, likely of SA-7 type.¹⁹

D. RSF new supply lines

41. The Panel identified three main routes, still active to date, for RSF supplies. The main one was through Eastern Chad. From June, various flight tracking experts observed a heavy rotation of cargo planes coming from Abu Dhabi international airport to Amdjarass airport in Eastern Chad, with stops in regional countries such as Uganda, Kenya and Rwanda.²⁰ Several media reports claimed that the aircrafts were transporting weapons, ammunition and medical equipment for RSF.²¹ On 28 November 2023, SAF Lieutenant General and

¹⁸ <https://sudantribune.com/article276768/>.

¹⁹ https://twitter.com/RSFSudan/status/1711483757411103161?t=WO_Kdj7r6Acfw4_nuDpT8g&s=08.

²⁰ See for instance <https://gerion.substack.com/p/a-new-mystery-airlift-between-the>.

²¹ <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/29/world/africa/sudan-war-united-arab-emirates-chad.html> and <https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-u-s-ally-promised-to-send-aid-to-sudan-it-sent-weapons-instead-82d396f>.

Sovereignty Council member, Yasir Al-Atta, made similar claims, accusing UAE and Chad of providing military support to RSF through Amdjarass.²² UAE responded to these allegations by stating that the cargo planes had a humanitarian purpose, in particular to establish a field hospital in Amdjarass for Sudanese refugees.²³

42. According to information gathered by the Panel from sources in Chad and Darfur, the allegations were credible. Several sources in eastern Chad and Darfur, including amongst local native and administrative leaders and armed groups operating in these areas, reported to the Panel that several times per week, weapons and ammunition shipments were unloaded from cargo planes arriving in Amdjarass airport,²⁴ then loaded on trucks. Small convoys, constituted of one to three trucks escorted by armed Landcruiser, left the airport through the western gate and reached Darfur border, through Bao or Kariari, where shipments were handed over to RSF. RSF transported the shipments to their base in Zuruk (Um Baru locality, North Darfur).²⁵ Some weapons were then distributed to RSF positions in Darfur, while most of them were transported from Zuruk to Khartoum through desert roads in northeastern Chad, the usually used by smugglers. The Panel Permanent Representatives of the UAE and Chad to the United Nations on 14 December 2023, sharing Panel's findings. In response, dated 21 December 2023, the UAE denied any involvement in the shipment of arms and ammunition from the UAE to RSF through Chad. It also noted that the flights from the UAE transported humanitarian assistance (Annex 5). As of 22 December 2023, the Panel has yet to receive a response from Chad.
43. Several RSF field commanders, chosen for their knowledge of the border area and desert routes, oversaw supervising the transportation of the weapons into Darfur and Sudan. They included Abdallah Chagab, a former SLA/MM field commander who joined RSF in 2014, now one of the RSF field commanders in Bahri (Khartoum), from Zaghawa community. These large-scale and sustained supplies ranged from small and lights weapons to UCAVs, anti-aircraft missiles, mortars and various types of ammunition.²⁶
44. According to various sources, in particular amongst members of southern Libyan communities such as Tebu and Darfurian armed groups based in Libya, RSF used another supply route into Darfur, from southern Libya. RSF procured substantial quantities of fuel from there. Some elements of the Darfurian armed movements in Libya, who had facilities to buy fuel at cheaper rate thanks to their relations with the LNA, played a leading role in this smuggling. Tanker trucks belonging to the movements and escorted by some of their elements transported the fuel to RSF in North Darfur through the Libya – Chad – Sudan tri-border area, often through Amdjarass.
45. RSF also purchased cars from Libya, in particular Toyota Landcruiser, which, like fuel, were essential to their military tactics based on mobility and pace. For instance, the Panel was aware of a case in September when RSF imported several dozens of new cars from southern Libya. Cars were gathered in Sebha, then were brought in Darfur to Zuruk by drivers hired by the RSF, through Kufra. In another case, when they returned from Libya to Sudan through Darfur to join the RSF in mid 2023, Hilal's splinter groups came with

²² <https://sudantribune.com/article279814/>.

²³ See for instance <https://www.agenzianova.com/fr/news/sudan-gli-emirati-smentiscono-le-accuse-sull'invio-di-armi-e-munizioni-alle-forze-di-supporto-rapido/>.

²⁴ Several photos attributed to members of the Chadian security forces reportedly show some shipments, including boxes of weapons and ammunition such as Type 56 assault rifles. See for instance <https://www.facebook.com/100064727614082/posts/pfbid0cc6gSijfU75eAZii79yVc34oiNV7Nwk2cngA9Cswa46NNGVpaF9gfcBxkjRNVpkdl/?d=n&mibextid=WC7FNe> and <https://www.facebook.com/100004271381101/posts/pfbid02aUuW5K7ixfu5jTsUhuEsX8VA7PAS6YaVvRdQ6z8gBUk9jiYQL4BwVfUnCvjYkSMl/?d=n&mibextid=WC7FNe>.

²⁵ Hemetti's clan settled in Zuruk around 2017, under the leadership of his uncle Juma Dagolo. On Zuruk and RSF's establishment there, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/29/darfur-towns-rise-out-of-ashes-of-sudan-war>.

²⁶ Information triangulated from several military and intelligence sources, and local interlocutors in Sudan and Chad.

several dozens of new Landcruiser, purchased for them by RSF, according to members of these groups.

46. RSF were also able to procure weapons through Libya. For instance, the Panel was aware that in the first weeks of the conflict, RSF asked for the cooperation of a Darfurian armed movement based in Libya in transporting artillery items and ammunition obtained in Libya to Darfur, proposing in return to give a share of the equipment to the movement. While the movement's field commanders were in favour of that deal, this did not happen because the head of the movement vetoed it.
47. In these operations from Libya, RSF benefited from coordination with several LNA brigades based in southern Libya. These included Subul Al-Salam, a predominantly Zuwaya, Salafist brigade based in Kufra and controlling the border with Sudan, with whom some RSF forces were already cooperating for smuggling activities before the war. According to various Libyan sources, Subul Al-Salam was instrumental in facilitating RSF's replenishment with fuel, cars and ammunition. The 128 Brigade, which had a presence in southern localities such as Sebha and was the main Libyan partner of Darfurian armed movements, was also involved.
48. Finally, RSF secured a supply route from South Sudan for fuel. Trucks carrying fuel moved from Juba to Wau, weekly. From Wau, fuel was transported in civilian cars such as Landcruiser to Raja, then to RSF-controlled areas in South Darfur, through Kafia-Kingi. While local South Sudanese officers, such as some army officers in Wau, were involved in this smuggling, South Sudanese Government authorities did not play any role.
49. The Panel notes that the transfers of arms and ammunition into Darfur constituted violations of the arms embargo.

D. Arms from Central African Republic (CAR)

50. According to multiple sources in Sudan and the CAR,²⁷ RSF acquired weapons and ammunition in north-eastern CAR on two occasions in the first weeks of the conflict. The first transaction occurred on 28 April 2023 when three RSF vehicles travelled from the Am Dafok area, Sudan, to Birao, CAR, where they received the first batch of weapons. A similar transaction took place on 3 May, approximately 25 kilometres east of Birao, in Terfele (CAR). The Sudanese authorities in Bangui had raised the issue with the CAR Government after the first transaction which may explain the shift to a more discreet location for the second delivery.
51. According to multiple military sources, these weapons included MANPADS and associated ammunition that RSF sought to acquire to counter SAF's air force. Subsequently, RSF transported these military supplies from CAR to South Darfur, passing through the Am Dafok region, before they ultimately reached Khartoum.
52. The operations were coordinated and executed by the RSF commander Al-Jazouli Abdallah, operating from the Am Dafok region. Prior to his affiliation with RSF in early 2023, Al-Jazouli, a member of the Taisha community, had an extensive history as an active arms smuggler in the border area. He was known for supplying weapons to various CAR rebel groups. Moreover, Al-Jazouli had maintained favourable business relations with the Sultan of Kara, who is based in the town of Terfele.²⁸ By engaging in these arms acquisitions and transportation, RSF violated the arms embargo.

²⁷ Interviews with Sudan Government, UN officials, and military sources.

²⁸ On Al-Jazouli's past arms smuggling activities, see the Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the CAR, December 2019, S/2019/930.

V. Humanitarian crisis and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) violations

A. Overview

53. According to OCHA, and as of 7 December, an estimated 12,000 people had been killed since the beginning of the conflict in Sudan.²⁹ The conflict caused large scale humanitarian crisis, and displaced approximately 6.8 million people (5.4 million IDPs, 1.4 million refugees).³⁰
54. In Darfur, the violence intensified, particularly in urban areas, which severely impacted civilians. According to intelligence sources, between 10,000 -15,000 people were killed in El Geneina alone. With approximately 4.7 million IDPs, 1.7 million people were displaced for the first time, and many of the already existent 3 million IDPs were displaced a second or third time.³¹ The conflict was a main driver of food insecurity, with **over half** of the population in Darfur facing acute hunger.³² The violence had a **particular impact** on women and children who were subject to increased sexual violence and other violations, including child rights violations.
55. Overall, the conflict caused more than 1.4 million people in Sudan to **flee to neighbouring** countries, more than half to countries neighbouring Darfur. **Approximately 555.000** fled the violence in West Darfur crossing the border to Chad where **the situation was precarious** as humanitarian assistance was lacking the necessary **funding to respond to soaring** needs. In addition, many took perilous journeys through East Darfur to reach South Sudan for refuge.

B. IHL violations by the warring parties

56. Disproportionate and indiscriminate attacks on civilians, mistreatment of civilians (torture, rape, killing, mass arrests and detentions), forced displacement, pillaging and destruction of critical civilian infrastructure, **including** humanitarian assets and attacks on personnel, constituted war crimes under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and customary humanitarian law.³³ Some of these violations may have amounted to crimes against humanity.³⁴
 - ***Indiscriminate shelling and aerial bombing in highly populated areas, attacks on critical civilian infrastructure, pillaging***
57. SAF and RSF indiscriminately used heavy artillery and shelling in highly populated areas severely impacting civilians in El Geneina, Nyala, Zalingei, and El Daein (see Chapter VI and Chapter VII). SAF used aerial bombings in urban areas in El Fasher, Nyala and El Daein. The shelling by both parties caused widespread destruction of critical civilian infrastructure necessary for basic services including water, sanitation, healthcare, and education. Schools, hospitals, markets, government buildings and humanitarian assets were looted mostly by RSF and allied militia, and destroyed by shelling and bombing by the two warring parties. (See Annex 2, 3 and 4 for satellite images of the destruction in Nyala, Zalingei, and El Geneina)

²⁹ OCHA Sudan Humanitarian Update, 7 December 2023.

<https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/sudan/sudan-humanitarian-update-7-december-2023>.

³⁰ IOM DTM Sudan <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/dtm-sudan-weekly-displacement-snapshot-13?close=true>.

³¹ UNHCR <https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing-notes/nearly-4-000-killed-civilian-property-destroyed-raging-conflict-sudan-s-darfur>.

³² FAO The Sudan: Food security crisis intensifies amid ongoing conflict and economic challenges <https://www.fao.org/newsroom/detail/the-sudan--food-security-crisis-intensifies-amid-ongoing-conflict-and-economic-challenges/en>.

³³ Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions 1949, see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Article 8.

³⁴ Prohibition of crimes against humanity is a peremptory norm of international law that binds all States, see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Article 7.

- ***New displacement and violence against IDP camps***

58. IDP camps in west, south and central Darfur, many reliant on humanitarian aid previous to the conflict, were attacked and confined aggravating the lack of access to medical care, water and food. Since the beginning of the conflict, IDPs in Zalingei's Hasahisa camp, where the Fur community represented the majority, were caught between RSF and SAF crossfire, causing deaths and injuries. Local sources reported that male youth were stopped at RSF-controlled checkpoints and denied access to other areas, as they were suspected of joining SAF.³⁵ Finally, on 31 October when RSF took over SAF's base in Zalingei, at least 16.250 IDPs were violently displaced from this camp. The Panel received reports from local monitors of the rape of 24 women by RSF.³⁶(See Annex 2 for maps and satellite images showing the impact and destruction of Hasahisa camp).
59. By October, Kalma IDP Camp (Nyala) became severely overcrowded, housing up to 500.000 IDPs who fled from the violence in Nyala. IDPs reported the camp was under siege by RSF, that they were robbed, and prevented from leaving, while also being arbitrarily detained at RSF controlled checkpoints while trying to leave. Women were subjected to sexual violence. There was a critical lack of food.
60. According to local sources, 80.000 IDPs, mostly women and children who were displaced from the north of El Fasher, Nyala, Zalingei, El Geneina, Tawila and Kutum, found shelter in El Fasher in overcrowded school buildings, or were left in the open. IDPs were in vulnerable conditions, with acute healthcare and food needs.

- ***Widespread harassment, arbitrary arrests, detentions, torture and ransom for release***

61. The Panel received reports of widespread harassment, physical abuse, arbitrary arrests and detention, torture and killings targeting community leaders, lawyers, journalists, resistance committee members and human rights activists by RSF and allied militia. The targeting was primarily due to the work they performed before and during the conflict as they continued to monitor, report and advocate against violations committed by the warring parties.
62. For example, the Darfur Bar Association (DBA) reported to the Panel that more than 20 colleagues were threatened, 16 members were arbitrarily detained and tortured, and seven killed by RSF and allied militia.³⁷In addition, the Panel documented at least ten cases in which prominent female human rights activists, lawyers and journalists in El Fasher, El Geneina and Nyala were harassed, physically abused, some threatened with rape or killed by RSF and allied militia. Furthermore, women interviewed by the Panel reported being threatened by SAF in Nyala and El Fasher due to their monitoring activities.³⁸ Although many fled from Darfur fearing for their lives, they continued to receive threats. For example, in El Fasher a prominent female lawyer was threatened, arbitrarily detained, and tortured twice by RSF.³⁹ Although she fled the Sudan, she continued to receive threats. Similarly, SAF arbitrarily detained and interrogated a prominent female journalist in El Fasher.⁴⁰
63. Similarly, RSF, and sometimes SAF, harassed, arbitrarily arrested, detained and tortured civilians in El Fasher, Zalingei, Nyala, El Geneina upon suspicion that they were ethnically aligned with the opposing warring party. This impacted both Arab and African

³⁵ Interviews with survivors and local sources September, October and November 2023.

³⁶ Local sources and IOM Early Warning Flash Alert <https://mailchi.mp/iom/dtm-sudan-flash-alert-conflict-in-zalingi-zalingi-town-central-darfur-update-004?e=c80f555fd9>.

³⁷ DBA confirmed: 4 members killed in El Geneina and 3 in Nyala. Torture cases confirmed: 6 in El Geneina, 2 in Zalingei, 5 in Nyala, 3 in El Fasher.

³⁸ Interviews with local monitors and activists October and November 2023.

³⁹ Interviews with local lawyers October and November 2023.

⁴⁰ Interviews with various journalists and activists local sources, June to November 2023.

communities.⁴¹ For example, an Arab aid worker in El Fasher was continuously harassed by SAF who accused him of aligning with RSF due to his ethnicity. He was arbitrarily arrested, detained and interrogated, following which he fled the city.⁴²

64. RSF commonly demanded ransom for the release of those they detained. The Panel received information of over 9 cases in Murnei (West Darfur) who were detained upon suspicion of supporting SAF. Most of those released had to pay a ransom.⁴³ In Nyala, RSF and allied militia kidnapped a prominent lawyer, and demanded a large ransom for his release. The lawyer was subsequently killed and left by a road, his body found with torture marks.⁴⁴

- ***Conflict Related Sexual Violence***

65. The escalation of the conflict exposed women and girls to increased risks of sexual violence. Sexual violence was not only widespread but escalated across Darfur as the conflict progressed. The Panel interviewed reliable sexual and gender-based violence local monitors who reported 262 rape cases over the period April to August.⁴⁵ The figures were likely to be much higher due to underreporting, the overall lack of access to healthcare, lack of connectivity, and the fear of stigma and marginalization from the victims' communities.
66. Widespread sexual violence committed by members of RSF and allied militia were reported in all areas under RSF control.⁴⁶ Women and girls aged 9 to 75 were at risk of being raped in IDP camps, when traveling, at checkpoints, and in their homes.⁴⁷ Racial slurs were common during the violations. In El Geneina, women were targeted due to their Masalit ethnicity (see Chapter VI). In Nyala, almost all the cases of sexual violence took place in IDP camps and in neighbourhoods inhabited by African communities. Similar patterns were observed in Zalingei and El Fasher.⁴⁸
67. Kidnapping, ransom and sexual exploitation formed part of the conflict-related sexual violence patterns. For example, reliable local sources reported at least 25 cases of kidnapping, rape and sexual exploitation at RSF-controlled Aldaman Hotel in Nyala. In El Geneina, the Panel received reports of 16 girls being kidnapped and raped by multiple men in an RSF house (see Chapter VI).

- ***Violations of child rights, recruitment and use of children***

68. The escalation of conflict in Darfur exposed children to increased risks of sexual violence, killings and mass forced displacement. Schools were looted, occupied or destroyed while access to humanitarian aid was limited. Furthermore, the Panel received information of recruitment and use of children by the two warring parties. Local sources confirmed seeing children in the ranks of RSF and SAF, including in recruitment camps, in El Fasher, Zalingei and Nyala. The Panel's sources report that Arab community leaders recruited boys into RSF. Some mentioned that boys signed up themselves at recruitment centres in the cities. In Nyala, according to local sources, new under-aged recruits were promised sums between 200,000-500,000 Sudanese pounds and looting gains.⁴⁹

⁴¹ Interviews with various journalists, local monitors, activists, lawyers, community leaders in June, July, October, November 2023.

⁴² Interview with survivors, October 2023.

⁴³ Ransom varied between 10,000 – 800,000 Sudanese pounds.

⁴⁴ Credible local sources interviewed by the Panel, October, November 2023. See also <https://sudantribune.com/article275775/>.

⁴⁵ The breakdown of the 262 cases by place of occurrence: RSF controlled areas in north El Fasher (27), Kutum (19), Tawila (8), El Geneina (63), Nyala (145) cases.

⁴⁶ Interviews with local monitors in Nyala, El Geneina, Zalingei, El Fasher throughout the reporting period.

⁴⁷ Interviews with various local monitors, SGBV experts from the areas June, July, October, and November 2023.

⁴⁸ Interviews with local monitors April-November 2023.

⁴⁹ Interviews with local monitors, journalists, April-November 2023.

VI. Case study 1: Ethnically targeted violence in El Geneina and Ardamatta

A. Overview

69. Between 24 April and 19 June, the city of El Geneina in West Darfur underwent a period of intense violence. This was followed by the takeover of SAF's 15 Division in Ardamatta on 4 November by RSF. Historic ethnic tensions between communities were instrumentalised by prominent military, political, and traditional leaders for their own political and economic gain. RSF and allied militia deliberately targeted civilian neighbourhoods, IDP gathering sites, and IDP camps, schools, mosques, and hospitals, while looting homes, INGOs and UN compounds. Furthermore, they deliberately rendered useless water pumps that were vital for the survival of the community. RSF and allied militia deliberately targeted Masalit community.
70. The cycle of violence had nine distinct phases (see table 2). Throughout these phases, the intensity of the violence fluctuated between two main patterns: RSF's large-scale, coordinated attacks employing heavy artillery in civilian neighbourhoods, primarily targeting the southern part of the city where the majority of the Masalit community resided (phases 1, 3, and 5); and periods of relative calm (phases 2 and 4), during which RSF with allied militias primarily engaged in activities such as resupplying (often through looting), mobilizing forces, establishing checkpoints to confine the population, targeting prominent leaders of the Masalit community, and strategically placing snipers throughout the city to limit people's movement. See annex 1 for arms and ammunition used during the violence in El Geneina.
71. The wave of attacks reached its peak with the siege of the city and the killing of Khamis Abdallah Abkar, the Wali (Governor) of West Darfur, who was last seen with the RSF West Darfur commander General Abdel-Rahman Juma Barktallah, on 14 June (phase 6). Consequently, a mass forced displacement took place from El Geneina to Adré, Chad, and Ardamatta, Sudan, located 6km northwest of El Geneina, where SAF headquarters were situated (phase 7). The latest wave of violence took place between 1 and 3 November (phase 8), that culminated with the takeover of SAF's 15th Division in Ardamatta on 4 November (phase 9).
72. During phases 1 to 7, SAF remained confined within their barracks, with some of their forces stationed near the Wali's home. Throughout the attacks, they failed to protect the population. Moreover, after the execution of the Wali on 14 June, the forces stationed around his house left the city and returned to their barracks in Ardamatta. Meanwhile, the signatory group to the JPA, the Sudanese Alliance (SA), faced challenges in mounting an organized military strategy to repel the attacks due to the lack of ammunition. Consequently, members of the SA resorted to individual resistance within their respective neighbourhoods, with some strategically positioned at locations such as the Wali's office and residence.
73. In the absence of any protection, self-defence groups of Masalit, which were established after the Krinding 1 attacks in late December 2019, took on the responsibility to protect the population. With insufficient military training and possessing inferior equipment, primarily consisting of light weapons, they were at a considerable disadvantage and unable to mount an effective response against the aggression.
74. On 1 November, RSF initiated attacks on Ardamatta SAF's 15th division, besieging both civilians and soldiers. Ardamatta, was SAF's last bastion in West Darfur, and the only place in El Geneina hosting Masalit population after the events of June.
75. Between 1 and 3 November, RSF and allied militias attacked Ardamatta and fought against SAF soldiers, some GSLF fighters who joined SAF's headquarters in May, members of the SA, and Masalit self-defense groups. On 3 November, several members of SAF fled to Seleia, Jebel Moon. On 4 November, remaining SAF soldiers, Masalit self-defense groups' members, and SA fighters withdrew towards Chad, where approximately 60 vehicles entered, surrendering their arms and ammunition to the Chadian authorities.

On the same day, RSF seized control of SAF's 15th Division, captured Ardamatta and detained numerous fighters and civilians (see paragraphs 98, 99 and 100). RSF arrested included Al-Walid Atta-Alla, the head of SAF Military Intelligence in El Geneina, accused by RSF of igniting intercommunal clashes in El Geneina by distributing arms and ammunition to the various local communities.

76. After capturing Ardamatta, RSF released a video on X (former Twitter) of its *de-facto* Wali Tijani Kharshom, walking with the community in the area and participating in cleaning efforts.⁵⁰ On 17 November, General Abdel-Rahman Juma Barktallah sent televised instructions to his soldiers to uphold the rule of law, protect citizens, and facilitate the safe delivery of humanitarian aid from Chad.⁵¹

Table 2: phases of the conflict in El Geneina and Ardamatta.

Phase of the conflict	Date	Main actions
Phase 1	24-27 April	Initial SAF-RSF clashes. Fighting spread to the southern neighbourhoods. RSF used heavy artillery in Masalit areas, including Al Jabal and IDP gathering sites.
Phase 2	28 April-11 May	RSF resupplied and assembled soldiers and Arab allied militias inside and around the city preparing for the next offensive. RSF targeted Masalit prominent leaders.
Phase 3	12-26 May	RSF and allied militias resumed attacks with heavy artillery in Masalit-populated neighbourhoods, IDP camps and IDP gathering sites.
Phase 4	27 May-5 June	RSF resumed resupplying and assembly of allied militias. RSF targeted Masalit individuals. RSF

⁵⁰ <https://twitter.com/RSFSudan/status/1723058260423365070?s=20>.

⁵¹ <https://twitter.com/RSFSudan/status/1725466481901642062>.

		placed new snipers in the city to confine the population.
Phase 5	6-13 June	RSF launched coordinated attacks with heavy artillery in Masalit neighbourhoods, including new and old IDP gathering sites and the surrounding areas of the residency of the Wali.
Phase 6	14 June	Killing of the Wali of West Darfur.
Phase 7	15-19 June	Mass forced displacement from El Geneina to Adre, Chad, and Ardamatta, Sudan. RSF targeted Masalit communities fleeing.
Phase 8	1-3 November	RSF attacked Ardamatta, and targeted Masalit who fled for refuge and prominent Masalit leaders.
Phase 9	4 November	RSF's took over the SAF's 15th Division headquarters.

B. Coordination between military, political and native leaders

77. The attacks were planned, coordinated, and executed by RSF and their allied Arab militias. The leaders of the Arab communities that were facilitating and coordinating the attack with RSF to El Geneina included Amir Masar Abdurahman Asseel (a leader of the Mahamid community based in the western outskirts of El Geneina), Tijani Karshom (also from the Mahamid community, based in Al Jabal, a member of JPA signatory movement, GSLF, and who was appointed as deputy Governor in July 2022).
78. Amir Masar and Karshom facilitated the recruitment of militias to fight alongside RSF with a number of other local Arab leaders, including Agid Ismail Albideri (from the Maharia community), Amir Hafiz Hassan (from the Misseriya) and Amir Hamid Al-Dawai (a leader of the Awlad Rashid community). In January, several of these leaders met with RSF leadership in Khartoum and in exchange for money they recruited members of their communities. The largest mobilization within El Geneina took place weeks before 15 April, when clashes in Khartoum commenced, and went on until 24 April (phase 1 of the conflict). These militias were assembled in various areas in El Geneina and

surrounding areas. These included, Al Jabal (on Karshom's block) and Wadi Rati (South), Rigil Alkubri (West), Um Alkora (North), and Um Duem (East). Additionally, militias were also gathered in Amir Masar's area, Kaskidik, Kurti, Um Sidera, Dula Laham, Adar, and Sukri. Throughout the conflict these sites continued to serve as assembly places for the militias.

79. RSF established local headquarters in neighbourhoods that served as operational centres. Amir Masar frequently visited some of these headquarters, distributing weapons, and coordinating RSF-militia. In addition, allied militias established their own operational centres which were frequently visited by RSF officers for coordination purposes. The largest of these centres was located in the building of the former Ministry of Animal Resources, others were in Al Nasaim area, Arbukni, an area known as water point 13, and Abdala Abdala school.
80. The coordination between RSF and allied militias went well beyond the boundaries of the city. The road between El Geneina and Adré (Chad) was under the coordinated control of RSF and allied militias. Mohamed Bashir was in charge and coordinated the deployment of mixed forces (RSF- allied militias) at each check point (the number of check points fluctuated between nine and three, depending on the day) with Agids. They also cooperated regarding the safe passage procedures. As an example, the Agid in control of Adikong area (the border area between Chad and Sudan), Anur Fayea Abouda (Mahamid community), attended together with Mohamed Bashir the local negotiations for the opening of border between Chad and Sudan.
81. It is important to note that not all members of the Arab communities were involved in the violence, and that many actively protected the Masalit people. Masalit individuals found refuge in the homes of their Arab neighbours, who assisted them in escaping to Adré, Chad. Many Masalit leaders expressed gratitude for being released based on assurances and declarations of innocence from their Arab neighbours.

C. Governance vacuum in El Geneina

82. After the fall of El Geneina on 14 June, the governance vacuum ensued. Tijani Karshom tried to capture this space and create an appearance of governance, while coordinating with RSF and influential local Arab militia leaders. This de facto administration engaged, for example, in negotiations with UN humanitarian agencies and INGOs for the delivery of humanitarian aid, which, at the time of writing, had been limited and primarily focused on local Arab communities. However, by November, traditional Arab leaders were each controlling their own territories paying little to no attention to Karshom's administration. Meanwhile, General Abdel-Rahman Juma Barktalla, who left El Geneina at the beginning of August, fought in Zalingei, and returned days before the attack on Ardamatta, established his base in the vicinity of El Geneina airport, and was appointed by Abdelrahim Dagalo as commander of the 15th Division.

D. Violations of IHL⁵²

83. The Panel collected evidence and testimonies from over 120 interviews with victims and eyewitnesses who consistently reported that RSF and allied militias committed IHL violations. The conflict led to ethnically motivated and forced mass displacement, with an estimated 555.000 individuals arriving in Chad since the beginning of the conflict.⁵³
84. On 15 June, RSF in a public statement denied any involvement in these violations and called for an independent investigation.⁵⁴ In a voice recording on 19 June, RSF

⁵² This section is based on interviews in Adré (Chad) Kampala (Uganda); Nairobi (Kenya); documentary evidence from UN agencies; interviews, documentary and photographic evidence from civil society organisations; interviews with international INGOs, May-July 2023.

⁵³ IOM DTM Sudan <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/dtm-sudan-weekly-displacement-snapshot-13?close=true>, 12 December 2023.

⁵⁴ <https://twitter.com/rsfsudan/status/1669325565118107650?s=48&t=9UpbqtEhdvNghN7ebfoOA>.

commander in West Darfur, General Abdel-Rahman Juma Barktallah, denied RSF's involvement in the violence; he blamed SAF for instigating tensions between the local communities and uncontrolled outlaws for the attacks on the Masalit including the killing of Wali Khamis Abakar. In a voice recording released on RSF social media on 20 June, Hemetti stated that an internal investigation committee would be formed and dispatched to El Geneina to collaborate with the said independent investigation, if established.⁵⁵ At the time of writing, it remained unclear whether this took place.

- ***Conflict-related sexual violence***

85. Conflict-related sexual violence committed by RSF and allied militia was widespread. Reliable local monitors reported to the Panel that from 27 April to 29 May, 63 rape cases took place in Al Jabal and Al Madaris areas. According to this and other reliable sources from El Geneina, women and girls, some as young as 14 years old, were raped by RSF elements in WFP storage facilities controlled by RSF (35), in their homes or when returning to their homes to collect their belongings after being displaced by the violence. Racial slurs towards the Masalit and non-Arab community formed part of the attacks. Furthermore, the Panel received reports of 16 girls being kidnapped by RSF soldiers in Al Jabal and Al Thawra neighbourhoods and raped in an RSF house. Due to the lack of access to medical care, no means of communication, and continued violence, these numbers were likely to be higher.

- ***Systematic and widespread looting, ethnically motivated attacks***

86. The systematic and widespread attacks, looting and destruction of civilian objects, including hospitals, mosques, schools, government buildings, markets, water points and humanitarian premises prevented access to basic services. Mosques and schools which were used for shelter, were attacked. Neighbourhoods and homes were continuously attacked, looted, burnt and destroyed, targeting the neighbourhoods during which Masalit and other African communities were harassed, physically assaulted, women sexually harassed, sexually abused, and at times executed. On a smaller scale, the Masalit communities also engaged in looting in the city centre, mainly of the INGOs' premises. (For satellite images of the destructi

- ***Snipers indiscriminately targeting civilians causing confinement***

87. RSF placed snipers on the main roads that indiscriminately targeted civilians, including women, pregnant women, and youth. All eyewitnesses saw many dead bodies on the roads of the city, with reports of 92 deaths and 21 injured. Although witnesses were unable to confirm total numbers of deaths, individuals reported seeing more than 13 bodies in one day. Eyewitnesses confirmed seeing bodies used as roadblocks. The threat of snipers, various RSF and militia checkpoints within the city, and the continued attacks confined neighbourhoods in the southern part of the city in which people had limited access to food and water.

Photo 1: El Geneina – Scattered bodies in El Geneina 16 June 2023

⁵⁵ <https://twitter.com/generaldagllo/status/1671142854108798976?s=48>.



Source: public photo, corroborated by the Panel

- ***Systematic targeting of IDP gathering sites***

88. There were 120 IDP gathering sites in El Geneina locality, hosting over 80,000 people, mostly Masalit, who were displaced in previous attacks on their community.⁵⁶ During the recent violence, these IDP gathering sites were systematically attacked, looted, burnt and destroyed. The severe and widespread attacks on these sites and neighbourhoods caused renewed displacement.
89. Civilians sought shelter in various schools and mosques, with the Azahara girls' boarding school in Al Madaris becoming a large gathering site housing an estimated 1,000 families, over 5,000 people. Next to it, the Algadima school, sheltered 3,500 families. These sites and others were bombed with heavy artillery and mortar. On 12 June, witnesses relayed that approximately 26 bombs hit IDP gathering sites in one day. Although exact numbers were difficult to establish, witnesses reported significant number of deaths and injured, including women and children, some estimating between 60 and 70 casualties daily.

Photo 2: IDP gathering sites targeted and destroyed during the conflict in El Geneina



Source: confidential

⁵⁶ December 2019 and January 2020, Krinding one and two, see Panel final report S/2023/93, 7 February 2023, section XI.

Photo 3: Figures: IDP gathering sites targeted and destroyed during the conflict in El Geneina



Source: confidential

- ***Systematic ethnically motivated and targeting killings of prominent Masalit community members***

90. Ethnically motivated and targeted killings where RSF and allied militia attacked the homes of those on a list of prominent Masalit community leaders, human rights activists, lawyers, teachers and journalists were systematic. 95. Survivors reported being targeted and threatened due to their profession and Masalit ethnic identity. At least two prominent lawyers were directly targeted and killed by RSF and allied militia due to their involvement in legal cases concerning previous attacks on Masalit communities.⁵⁷ Three prominent doctors and seven staff were directly targeted and killed. Known prominent community leaders were harassed and some executed. Human rights activists were killed while monitoring and reporting on the events.

- ***Targeted attacks on hospitals and medical facilities***

91. RSF and allied militias looted and destroyed all hospitals and medical storage facilities that resulted in the collapse of health services. As a direct consequence of these attacks, 37 women with childbirth complications, and 200 dialysis patients died.⁵⁸ Furthermore, witnesses stated that some patients were executed in the clinics and the emergency clinics were attacked. On 6 May, due to the scarcity of medical supplies, the late Wali Khamis Abdallah Abkar attempted to evacuate the seriously injured to Chad. This plan fell through as the RSF demanded high fees for safe passage.

- ***Seeking protection at Ardamatta – the forced displacement and mass killings of civilians***

92. Following the killing of the Wali, Masalit and other African communities decided to seek protection at Ardamatta. At midnight, a convoy of thousands of people, including women, children, injured, elderly, vehicles, and animals moved from Al Madaris and Al Jamarek neighbourhoods towards Ardamatta. When reaching Ashati area and Anasim bridge, RSF and allied militia indiscriminately opened fire on the convoy. Survivors reported that an estimated 1000 people were killed.

⁵⁷ Legal cases concerning 2019 Krinding attack and 2020 Mestray attacks.

⁵⁸ Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA). "Press Statement: The footprints of genocide can be traced in Al Geneina." June 16, 2023. <https://sihanet.org/press-statement-the-footprints-of-genocide-can-be-traced-in-al-geneina/>.

93. To escape the attack, the convoy was separated, when at least 100 of those attempting to cross the river drowned. The RSF and allied militia killed and estimated 300 (mostly women and children) of those who were fleeing West. Thousands of civilians remained in Ardamatta and were extremely vulnerable, lacking access to food and medicine.⁵⁹ In November, these Massalit survivors were targeted and attacked in November (see below).

- ***Fleeing to Adré***

- *By foot – indiscriminate shootings and summary executions*

94. Between 14 and 17 June, an estimated 12 000 people, including women and children, left El Geneina for Adré by foot.⁶⁰ When reaching RSF checkpoints women and men were separated, harassed, searched, robbed, and physically assaulted. RSF and allied militias indiscriminately shot hundreds of people in the legs to prevent them from fleeing.⁶¹ Young men were particularly targeted and interrogated about their ethnicity. If identified as Masalit, many were summarily executed with a shot to the head. Women were physically and sexually assaulted. Indiscriminate shootings also injured and killed women and children. All testimonies mentioned many dead bodies along the road, including those of women, children and young men.⁶²

- *By vehicle – harassment, arbitrary detention and summary executions*

95. Many refugees reached Adré by paying RSF and allied militias.⁶³ Fees were also paid at various RSF and militia road checkpoints and passengers robbed and interrogated about their ethnicity. Many survivors reported fearing that they would be recognised as Masalit teachers, human rights activists, lawyers or prominent leaders. Men suspected of being Masalit fighters were summarily executed, while others were arbitrarily detained and taken to detention centres in El Geneina. Like those on foot, these witnesses reported seeing many dead bodies along the road, including those of women, children and the elderly. One witness stated seeing 105 dead children on her journey.

- ***Collection of bodies and mass graves***

96. Bodies started decomposing as they could not be collected due to snipers, confinement, and the ongoing threat of violence in El Geneina. Eventually, RSF initiated the removal of war remnants from the city. On 17 June, with RSF approval, Sudanese Red Crescent volunteers began to collect dead bodies from roads, houses, including bodies found at IDP gathering sites and other sites where people had sought refuge. One volunteer reported working for a week, loading a truck with an estimated 400 bodies, including those of women and children, many with bullet wounds to the head. The bodies were buried in various mass graves. The United Nations Joint Human Rights Office received reports of at least 13.⁶⁴
97. During the night of 3 November SAF left the 15th division without warning civilians in Ardamatta of their exit and surrender to RSF. Subsequently, on 4 November, RSF took control of Ardamatta and confined civilians. Fighters mostly belonging to the Masalit community and other African tribes previously taking refuge at the SAF HQ were detained. RSF reported having 700 prisoners of war, it was unknown where these people were at the time of writing.

- ***Violence in Ardamatta November 2023***

⁵⁹ Communities fleeing the violence in Kereinik, Sisi IDP camp and Moumei were part of those seeking refuge.

⁶⁰ Approximately 27-30 km.

⁶¹ On 16 June, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in Adré officially reported treating 622 injured within three days after the Wali was killed. See <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.ca/over-600-war-wounded-sudanese-arrive-in-adre-hospital-in-eastern-chad-in-the-space-of-just-three-days/>.

⁶² Many were stopped at Adikong. Reports confirmed various dead bodies in this area.

⁶³ 30,000-40,000 Sudanese pounds per person.

⁶⁴ UNITAMS Special Representative of Secretary-General's remarks to the Security Council on 13 September 2023 <https://unitams.unmissions.org/en/srsg-sudan-and-head-unitams-volker-perthes-remarks-security-council-13-september-2023>.

98. Following the initial clashes between SAF and RSF on 1, 2 and 3 November, more than 8,000 people, mostly Masalit women and children, fled to Adre, Chad.⁶⁵ Most Masalit men were unable pass the RSF and militia-controlled checkpoints. Eyewitnesses reported to the Panel that RSF and allied militia interrogated people at the checkpoints about their ethnicity, harassed, robbed, beat, whipped, and arbitrarily detained them. During these three days, Arab families also fled the violence and crossed the border into Chad. In contrast, these families included teenaged boys and adult men who were able to pass the checkpoints.⁶⁶
99. In neighbourhoods and local IDP camps, RSF and allied militia raided homes in search of Masalit men and youth. They subsequently looted and set on fire many homes. According to local sources, male adolescents and adults suspected to be Masalit were executed by RSF and allied militia. A survivor reported hiding among the dead bodies (see picture 4 below). Sources confirmed that the bodies in the below picture were Masalit civilians killed by RSF and allied militia. Furthermore, at least two prominent Masalit community leaders were targeted and executed. For example, on 5 November, Mohammed Arbab, part of the Native Administration, was executed as well as his family members.⁶⁷ Estimates indicated over 66 Masalit men were summarily executed in one day.⁶⁸

Photo 4: Photo of killings of Masalit civilians in Ardamatta November 2023



Source: Widely circulated photo, verified by the Panel.

100. RSF and allied militia arbitrarily detained and tortured hundreds of male adolescents and adults. A survivor interviewed by the Panel reported being detained and tortured with several hundred other detainees, of which only four escaped.⁶⁹ According to eyewitnesses, although women were not directly targeted, some were killed by random shooting and subjected to sexual violence. Although overall death estimates were difficult to establish, reports indicated 800 to 2000 killings, while many people were also reported missing.⁷⁰ According to survivors, RSF and allied militia forced civilian detainees to

⁶⁵ UNHCR <https://www.unhcr.org/news/press-releases/sudan-unhcr-warns-increasing-violence-and-human-rights-violations-against>

⁶⁶ Interviews with eyewitness and Chad entry point monitor November 2023.

⁶⁷ Interview with survivors, journalists, activists and community leader November, December 2023.

⁶⁸ OHCHR <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2023/11/sudan-killings-ardamata>.

⁶⁹ Interview with Ardamatta survivors in Adre, Chad November 2023.

⁷⁰ Sudan Tribune RSF Kills over 2,000 civilians in West Darfur's Ardamata

<https://sudantribune.com/article279216/>

UNHCR warns of increasing violence and human rights violations against civilians in Darfur <https://www.unhcr.org/news/press-releases/sudan-unhcr-warns-increasing-violence-and-human-rights-violations-against>

collect the bodies and bury them. The Panel received information of at least three mass graves.⁷¹

VII. Case study 2: conflict dynamics in Nyala

A. Overview

101. In August, RSF intensified their operations to capture Nyala when faced with difficulties to achieve their remaining military objectives in Khartoum. Nyala was the second largest in Sudan and a commercial hub with South Sudan and CAR. Testifying to the importance of taking the city, RSF's deputy commander-in-chief, Abdelrahim Dagalo, oversaw the assault.
102. In July, the RSF besieged the 16th Division headquarters. On 26 October, RSF forces took control of the base after a four-day assault and gained full control of the city and South Darfur state. This base housed a crucial component of the SAF's Western Region Command, including artillery, engineers, and armoured vehicles.
103. The RSF's victory was helped by internal divisions in the SAF garrison, illustrated by the killing of SAF commander, Yasser Fadlallah Al-Khindr Al-Saim, on 21 August by one of his soldiers, and the defection of dozens of SAF soldiers. The final RSF takeover was the outcome of negotiations between RSF and new SAF commander, Brigadier General Hussein Muhammad Jawdat.
104. On 22 November, RSF issued directives to address violations in Nyala, emphasizing a semblance of governance. Abdelrahim Dagalo urged inhabitants to return to their homes. The RSF directed police and community leaders to manage the day-to-day governance of the city.

B. Large recruitment drive in South Darfur prior to the conflict⁷²

105. During February and March 2023, numerous youths from rural areas in South Darfur were assembled in Nyala and subsequently sent to RSF training camps located in the Khartoum area, such as Tayba and Omdurman. Eyewitnesses and video footage confirmed the presence of trucks transporting these recruits inside Nyala. The recruits hailed from local Arab communities, including Terjem (Bulbul Timbisco area), Beni Halba (Eid el Fursan), Habbaniya (Boram), Taisha (Am Dafok area), Sa'ada (Gardut area), Misseriya (Nitega area), and Fellata (Tulus area).
106. In exchange for providing RSF with several hundred members from their respective communities, the native leaders were granted incentives such as cars, money, and, in some cases, RSF military ranks. Multiple sources within the traditional leadership corroborated these arrangements. For instance, the *Nazir* (highest traditional leader) of Fellata, Mohamed Al-Futi Ahmed Alsamani, a close associate of Hemetti after the December 2018 revolution, actively participated in selecting members of his community, including Abdallah Yagoub, who became one of the prominent RSF commanders in Nyala.
107. Certain RSF officers also played pivotal roles in the recruitment process. Notably, Taha Humaidan, a prominent member of RSF peace committee in Darfur and a relative of Hemetti, along with Alnazir Yunis, hailing from the Misseriya community and another key committee member, took charge. As part of their work in RSF peace committee that served as a mediator in various intercommunal conflicts, these officers established strong ties with numerous traditional leaders which proved advantageous for RSF in the recruitment efforts.

⁷¹ Interview with Ardamatta survivors and local monitors in Adre, Chad, November 2023.

⁷² This section is based on in-person and phone interviews with a broad range of interlocutors from South Darfur, including native leaders and relevant armed groups, April-November 2023.

C. Coordination between military and native leaders⁷³

108. As in West Darfur, RSF's offensives against SAF division in Nyala received assistance from members of several Arab communities who were recruited and armed for these operations. These local militia members, often traveling by motorcycle, were involved in various activities such as attacks on individuals, burglaries, looting, and theft of INGO cars.
109. The mobilization of armed members from local Arab communities was facilitated by traditional chiefs. The *Nazir* of Terjem, Mohamed Ibrahim, publicly called on his community to support RSF, resulting in numerous Terjem members arriving in Nyala to back RSF and participating in looting. Similarly, on 17 May, the *Nazir* of Misseriya, Al-Tijani Abdulgadir Mohamed Osman, released a statement expressing support for RSF. Osman Alnur, an *Omda* (traditional leader) from the Awlad Rashid community, also mobilized members of his community to support RSF. Additionally, the Fellata *Nazir* sent several dozen fighters to support RSF in Nyala.
110. RSF officers also played a significant role in mobilizing militias by enlisting members from their own communities to support RSF. During clashes with SAF, Alnazir Yunis mobilized members of his Misseriya community, leading to heavy losses among them. Another important RSF commander, Adam Aboushanab, who was actively involved in RSF mining companies in South Darfur, recruited several dozen members from his Ereigat community to support RSF's efforts.

D. IHL violations in Nyala

111. According to local sources, RSF and allied militia infiltrated and took control of civilian neighbourhoods, looted and occupied homes and public buildings. Indiscriminate and disproportionate heavy artillery shelling from SAF towards suspected neighbourhoods resulted in the heaviest losses of civilian life, with artillery hitting people's homes. In retaliation, RSF shelling targeting the SAF 16th Division hit the civilian neighbourhoods near the base. Many civilians died in the crossfire from the warring parties. For example, on 21 August, SAF shelling hit a market killing 24 people.⁷⁴ Similarly, on 22 August, approximately 41 civilians, mainly women and children, were killed from SAF shelling when sheltering under Taiba bridge in South Nyala.⁷⁵
112. SAF's military response took on a new dimension on 3 and 13 September, when for the first time in Darfur since the conflict started, SAF used aerial bombings on civilian neighbourhoods. Local sources report at least 54 civilians were killed by the airstrikes and many injured amidst limited medical care facilities, as there was only one functional hospital. The continued shelling and additional aerial bombing destroyed much of the city and its public infrastructure, including the main market. Interrupted communication networks severely hampered the monitoring of the situation. Water and electricity services were cut off and access to food was limited. There was little access to markets, and many struggled to pay for goods as there were no economic opportunities while prices soared. (See Annex 4)
113. Death estimates were difficult to confirm. The heavy shelling and aerial bombing led to a significant surge in forced displacement, South Darfur being the state from which most IDPs fled in Darfur, with approximately 794,000 civilians fleeing to nearby localities to North Darfur (El Fasher) and East Darfur (El Daein).⁷⁶

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Sudan's armed forces fails to protect civilians during air raids: Activists | Conflict News | Al Jazeera

⁷⁵ Local sources interviewed in October 2023 and <https://sudantribune.com/article276645/>

⁷⁶ IOM Situation Update Sudan, 21 November 2023.

<https://sudan.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd11606/files/documents/2023-11/iom-regional-sudan-crisis-response-situation-update-32.pdf>.

114. Furthermore, RSF and allied militia arbitrary arrested and detained, kidnapped and killed civilians, while also committing acts of sexual violence, looting and recruiting children (see paragraphs 61 to 67).

VIII. Financing of the warring parties in Darfur

A. Overview

115. By the time the current conflict erupted, RSF and SAF already had substantial financial means in Sudan and the region. The RSF for example were controlling most of the gold trade in Sudan.⁷⁷ RSF invested large proceeds from the gold business in several industries. While SAF were also controlling several important economic sectors and companies,⁷⁸ their profits from these eroded following the beginning of the war, as many of these assets were headquartered or based in Khartoum. Now, SAF relied largely on wealthy individuals and businessmen aligned with them to finance their military capability.⁷⁹

116. RSF and SAF drew on these investments and resources - some of which were owned through proxy and subsidiary companies - to fund their operations. This was used to acquire weapons, pay salaries, fund media campaigns, lobbying, and buy support of other political and armed groups, including in Darfur.⁸⁰

117. During the reporting period, the Panel received information that up to 50 companies⁸¹ associated with RSF were directly or indirectly funding the force. The Panel could corroborate that several of these companies, most of which were based in regional countries, were owned by senior members of RSF and their associates. An analysis of this information revealed investments in multiple sectors, including mining, security, agriculture, manufacturing, real estate, construction, and services such as consultancy and tourism. As such, for example, the Al-Junaid Company for Multi Activities was the holding company of various entities as depicted in the figure below. The company was owned by Abdelrahim Dagalo (RSF chief deputy) and Abduljabbar Mohamed Ahmed (believed to be a relative to the Dagalo family).⁸² The Panel estimated that the total value of the Al-Junaid Company for Multi Activities holdings amounts to several million USD dollars.⁸³

⁷⁷ <https://timep.org/2023/07/26/money-is-power-hemedti-and-the-rsfs-paramilitary-industrial-complex-in-sudan/>. Last accessed on 19 December 2023.

⁷⁸ Including in military equipment productions (Defence Industries System, Charitable organization (Martyrs' organization, among others. <https://thesentry.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/SudanParastatals-TheSentry-May2021.pdf>. Last accessed 19th December 2023.

⁷⁹ For instance, the Panel received reports on various businessmen purchasing military equipment for SAF.


⁸⁰ Several leaders and members of Darfurian armed movements acknowledged that their groups received money and logistics from the warring parties.

⁸¹ Confidential documents from sources within SAF and RSF. Other confidential sources directly involved in the transactions confirmed the veracity of these documents.

⁸² According to confidential documentation obtained by the Panel from a financial institution, they each owned 50% of the shares as of July 2021.

⁸³ Interviews conducted by the Panel in November 2023, and December 2023 gave various figures ranging from USD 5 Billion to USD 10 Billion as the net-worth of the entity. Various reports consulted by the Panel demonstrate that, for example in 2018 alone, RSF, whose mainstay company was Al Junaid, exported gold worth USD 30 million in a period of four weeks in 2018.

Multi-sector investments of Al-Junaid Company: Associated with RSF.



The Al-Junaid Company for Multi Activities holdings⁸⁴

A. Proxy companies

118. RSF accumulated multiple investments in proxy entities outside of Sudan during its existence. These entities, identified by the Panel, continued to change ownership and nature of business as to evade scrutiny. This was coupled with the continued recruitment of individuals in Sudan and in the region to help manage these entities and their changing ownership. In Dubai, UAE, for example, a former senior official of the Sudanese Central Bank became the RSF's financial adviser, helping it to manage this complex web of proxy companies and entities.⁸⁵

119. According to multiple confidential sources and documents consulted by the Panel, Al Khaleej Bank became instrumental to RSF's financing when the majority of ownership of this bank was acquired by individuals and entities associated with RSF in 2019. Confidential sources shared documentation with the Panel showing that in March 2023, a few weeks before the war started, a USD 50 million transfer was made from the Central Bank of Sudan to Al Khaleej Bank. This operation reportedly was the actual reason behind the dismissal of the Central Bank Governor, Hussain Yahia Jankol, on 14 May as he was deemed pro RSF.⁸⁶

120. Another striking example of this modus operandi was the Cadex Explosives for Civil Purposes company, partially owned by RSF associates, which owned shares in multiple other entities as shown in the figure below. These proxy companies continued to provide financial support to the activities of the RSF.⁸⁷

⁸⁴ Based on information and documentation received by Panel from confidential sources, August and December 2023.

⁸⁵ Interviews conducted Panel in Cairo in September 2023 described the civilian RSF structure. This was also confirmed by the Panel's local sources in November 2023.

⁸⁶ RSF insider and intelligence sources, June and December 2023.

⁸⁷ Confidential documents obtained and consulted by the Panel in August 2023. This was also collaborated with local sources in November and December 2023.




Figure showing multi-layered ownership of companies associated with the RSF⁸⁸

C. Internal Financing

121. Immediately after the war began, on 18 April, the Sudanese Ministry of Finance stopped salary payments to RSF members. However, this development did not affect RSF's military operations. RSF started paying their main commanders directly, in cash. For instance, RSF sources reported to the Panel that Juma Dagalo, Hemedti's uncle who oversaw RSF operations in Zuruk (North Darfur), was receiving regular payments from RSF.
122. The Panel also received information that RSF and SLA/MM, among other armed groups, were extorting payments for safe passage and protection from convoys and vehicles that were passing through their areas of control in Darfur. After taking control in most parts of Darfur, the RSF established several checkpoints and roadblocks along the traditional trade routes, such as from El-Obeid to El Fasher, and from Am Dafok to Nyala. SLA/MM and other JPA signatory groups formed similar checkpoints in North Darfur, in particular roads to Libya.
123. The Panel also documented details of smuggling operations and other criminal activities carried out by various armed groups, including JPA signatories and RSF. For example, these groups smuggled looted goods, including vehicles, from Khartoum to Chad through Darfur.

D. Mineral resources/Gold

124. Despite a significant decrease in production due to the war, gold continued to be a source of revenue for the warring parties. Governance vacuum and lack of control over the gold industry allowed gold smuggling networks to flourish. For instance, a Sudanese gold trader associated with RSF received 50kg of gold in Dubai in May 2023. This consignment, the first one since the outbreak of the war, came from Khartoum and transited through Port Sudan.⁸⁹ Since the beginning of the war, most of the gold which was previously exported to UAE, was now smuggled to Egypt^{90,91}.

- **Gold mapping in Darfur/Sudan.**

⁸⁸ This chart is based on reports and information received by the Panel in August 2023.


⁸⁹ Multiple resources including RSF insiders shared this information with the Panel.

⁹⁰ Various reports consulted by the Panel; interviews with confidential sources November and December 2023..

⁹¹ <https://kathmandupost.com/national/2023/12/10/egyptian-national-arrested-with-6-5-kg-from-kathmandu-airport>. Last accessed on 19 December 2023.

125. The Panel mapped gold and gold production in Darfur as part of the wider exercise of conflict funding. Extensive research and analyses included interviewing experts with detailed and close knowledge of the trade as well as documentation provided by confidential sources. While Darfur (with five states) was an important gold production area, it was not the largest gold producer. 15 out of 18 states of Sudan produced gold, with Red Sea being the highest producer. The gold distribution is shown in the map below.

The Exiting Companies sites in Sudan



Map courtesy of the Geographical Information System⁹²

126. Sudan gold was mined in two ways: by concession companies and through artisanal mining across. Gold mined in Darfur, which RSF largely controlled prior to April 2023, contributed a small percentage⁹³ to the total gold produced in the country. Reports indicated that over 50% of the gold mined in Sudan was not traded through the formal channels but was smuggled out of the country.⁹⁴ RSF had two documented concessions companies operating in Darfur in Radom, Singo Aghbash, Dharaba in South Darfur.

⁹² International Journal of Advances in Engineering and Management (IJAEM), Volume 4, Issue 11, November 2022, pp: 196-205, www.ijaem.net.

⁹³ Interviews with officials in the mining industry in Sudan estimate the percentage of this to be 30%.

⁹⁴ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gYdhLUaUzMk>. last accessed on 19 December 2023.

- *Artisanal gold mining in Darfur.*

127. Artisanal mining accounted for 30% of the gold mining in Sudan. In Darfur, for example, artisanal mining took place in several mines controlled by various armed actors including RSF, SLA/AW and local ethnic militias, such as from the Sa'ada in South Darfur. SLA/AW controlled gold mines in Jebel Marra, in particular in Torriye⁹⁵.

IX. Mediation Initiatives

A. Overview

128. Since the beginning of the conflict, different regional and international actors launched mediation initiatives: African Union (AU), Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Group of neighbouring countries, and the Jeddah initiative on ceasefire. These initiatives resulted in the creation of various working groups and committees and the elaborations of roadmaps aimed at solving the Sudanese crisis. However, none of the recommendations and commitments stemming from these initiatives, such as the establishment of humanitarian corridors, were implemented. The excess of mediation tracks and insufficient coordination, as well as entrenched positions of the warring parties combined with competing regional interests, meant that these peace efforts had yet to stop the war, bring political settlement or address the growing humanitarian crisis.

B. African Union (AU)

129. AU continued its efforts to mediate in the Sudanese crisis, using different approaches and channels. At the end of August, the AU announced its plan to organize in September a conference which would bring together main Sudanese political parties and civilian organizations.⁹⁶ At the time of writing, this conference, to be supervised by the AU Commission, did not materialize, due to internal disagreements between the civilian forces and potential participation of the former ruling National Congress Party (NCP).⁹⁷ The AU Commission also created the Expanded Mechanism and the Core Group on Sudan.⁹⁸ Since September, there was also a parallel initiative to gather Sudanese political actors, spearheaded by the AU chairperson, Comoros president Azali Assoumani.⁹⁹

130. On 15 November, the AU Peace and Security Council held a meeting on Sudan, attended by representatives from the United States of America (USA), Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In its communique, the Council stressed that there should be one, unified international mediation initiative on Sudan, under the joint leadership of AU and IGAD.¹⁰⁰

C. IGAD

131. During the reporting period, IGAD tried to mediate in the conflict through the Quartet Group (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and South Sudan), chaired by Kenyan President William Ruto. While RSF supported IGAD's role, SAF publicly rejected Ruto's implication in the file.¹⁰¹ On 10 July, in Addis Ababa, IGAD adopted the Roadmap for

⁹⁵ See Panel's final report S/2021/40, paragraphs 35, and 145-146.

⁹⁶ The projected list of participants would include FCC-Central Council, Democratic Bloc, Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party, Communist Party of Sudan, all JPA signatories, SPLM-N (Al Hilu faction), SLA/AW. See also https://www.sudanfacts.org/external_feeds/african-union-preparing-for-inter-sudanese-dialogue/.

⁹⁷ Interviews in person and by phone with SLA/AW, FCC and Democratic block, SPLM-N, former member of Transitional Government, Sudanese NGOs, in Cairo, Kampala, Juba, Nairobi, Addis-Ababa, September-December 2023.

⁹⁸ [Communique of the 1156th meeting of the PSC, held at the level of Heads of State and Government, on 27 May 2023, on the Situation in Sudan-African Union - Peace and Security Department \(peaceau.org\)](https://peaceau.org/).

⁹⁹ <https://beit-salam.km/actualite/C3%A9s/communique-presse-soudan.html>.

¹⁰⁰ Official communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of African Union, 15 November, 2023.

¹⁰¹ <https://sudantribune.com/article274476/>.

peace in Sudan and discussed the deployment of the East Africa Standby Force (EASF), a suggestion immediately rejected by SAF. In a meeting held on 6 September, IGAD Quartet Group stressed the importance for IGAD to be present in the Jeddah process and the need for all-inclusive consultations with civilian actors.

132. Relations between SAF and IGAD improved recently, as illustrated by the visits of al-Burhan to Nairobi and Djibouti and his meetings with President Ruto and Djibouti President and IGAD Chairman Ismail Omar Guelleh in November. These improved relations paved the way for the Extraordinary Assembly of IGAD Heads of State and Government, on 9 December, which focused on Sudan. The Assembly announced that both al-Burhan and Hemetti had agreed to an unconditional ceasefire and a one-to-one meeting.¹⁰² However, the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially denied that al-Burhan had agreed to any of these conditions.¹⁰³

D. Jeddah Talks

133. In early May, talks on ceasefire and humanitarian assistance between SAF and RSF started in Jeddah, under the auspices of the Saudi Arabia and USA authorities. On 11 May, the parties signed the Jeddah Declaration of Commitments to Protect the Civilians of Sudan, in which they made a commitment to allow for humanitarian access and respect IHL. The Jeddah Declaration was not implemented, and the talks first came to a halt in July.
134. On 4 November, during a second round of talks, the parties reaffirmed the Jeddah Declaration signed on 11 May. In addition, between others, the parties agreed to participate in a joint humanitarian forum to guarantee humanitarian access. The talks were suspended again in December, due to lack of progress. The main stumbling block between the two delegations was RSF's refusal to withdraw from Khartoum and other towns, a key SAF's demand.¹⁰⁴

E. Neighbouring states' initiative

135. Egypt hosted a meeting in Cairo on 13 July attended by neighbouring countries (Ethiopia, South Sudan, Chad, Eritrea, the CAR and Libya) to discuss the conflict in Sudan and find regional solutions.¹⁰⁵ This new initiative, as outlined in concluding statement of 13 July, was officially welcomed by both SAF and RSF.¹⁰⁶ A follow-up meeting was held in Chad on 7 August, where the foreign ministers of the neighbouring countries met. This meeting endorsed a plan to end the conflict including three key components, namely a ceasefire, a comprehensive intra-Sudanese dialogue and the facilitation of humanitarian access. A follow-up meeting ensued in New York on 20 September, on the side of the UN General Assembly.¹⁰⁷ At the time of writing, this initiative was continuing.

X. Impact of the situation in Darfur on the region

A. South Sudan

136. Since the beginning of the conflict, South Sudan expressed interest in mediating the Sudanese crisis given its historical, economic and security ties with Sudan. The idea had not materialised as leading international and regional actors were sceptical about the

¹⁰² Communiqué of the 41st Extraordinary Assembly of IGAD, Heads of the State and Government from 9 December 2023.

¹⁰³ <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-fa-ministry-disavowal-of-igad-communicue-raises-eyebrows>.

¹⁰⁴ Interviews in person and by phone with SLA/AW, FCC and Democratic block members, diplomats, Sudanese politicians, former members of Transitional Government, Kampala, Cairo, Nairobi, Juba, September–November 2023. See also: <https://sudantribune.com/article280013/>.

¹⁰⁵ <https://shabait.com/2023/-7/14/communique-of-sudans-neighbouring-states-summit-cairo-13th-of-july-2023/>.

¹⁰⁶ Final Statement of the Summit of the neighboring countries in Cairo, 14 July 2023.

¹⁰⁷ <https://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/186877/2-nd-meeting-of-FMs-of-Sudan-s-neighbouring-states-convenes-in-New-York?lang=en-us>.

political and financial capacity of the country to conduct and complete such a mission. According to the Panel's sources, SAF would have welcomed a strong involvement of South Sudan. On the other hand, RSF were more reluctant, doubting South Sudan's neutrality.¹⁰⁸

137. Security of oil pipelines from Upper Nile and Unity states to Port Sudan remained the key priority to Juba as revenues from oil present its main income.¹⁰⁹ South Sudan maintained relations with both RSF and SAF to secure an uninterrupted transit of oil. South Sudanese and Sudanese interlocutors informed the Panel that in June the South Sudanese officials negotiated with SAF additional security to the pipelines to avoid the possible damage from Sudanese armed actors.¹¹⁰ In October/November, RSF guaranteed to the South Sudanese authorities that they would not target oil facilities and that oil traffic would remain unaffected.¹¹¹
138. In October, South Sudanese authorities invited the JPA signatories to discuss possible solutions to the Sudanese crisis (see Table 1 and paras xxx.) In November, South Sudan received delegation from the Forces of Freedom and Change / Central Committee (FFC / CC). As a result of visit FFC and South Sudan formed Joint committee comprising representatives from both the FFC and the South Sudan Mediation Committee for Peace in Sudan.

B. Chad

139. The long border between Darfur and Chad, and the fact that several key Darfuri communities, including Zaghawa, Arabs and Masalit, were present in eastern Chad posed a risk of conflict spill over in border areas. The large-scale influx of refugees coming from West Darfur increased the tensions with host communities over access to services, land and resources. The economic situation in eastern Chad deteriorated, as the border closure reduced the basic imports from Sudan, mainly cereal, sugar and fuel.
140. Chadian authorities took measures to mitigate security risks in the border areas. Immediately after the outbreak of the conflict in Sudan, the Chadian Government established a committee to manage the Sudan crisis, gathering the relevant ministers. The authorities also sent military reinforcements to the border area, to prevent infiltrations of armed individuals. On November 28, the consul of Sudan in Chad, Ambassador Gaddafi Abdullah, met with the commander of the Joint Force, General Osman Bahar Itno, in the border town of Abeche. This was the first meeting between officials in the format of the Joint Force since the outbreak of conflict in Sudan.¹¹² The Chadian contingent of the Joint Force systematic continued patrolling the border area with Sudan on the line of Tine – Karjari – Tisi-Adde.
141. RSF established recruitment networks in Chad, amongst Arab communities in particular. For instance, in late May, four RSF cars came to the area of Marada, the stronghold of Rezeigat community in Chad, and returned to Sudan with several dozen recruits, according to the Chadian military. While the Chad authorities received information about this intrusion, they could not intercept the vehicles.
142. The Chadian authorities tried to play a role in the mediation initiatives, in particular through the neighbouring States' initiative. For example, on 2 December, President Deby held a meeting with former Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok, on the side of the UN Climate Change Conference in the UAE, to discuss political solutions to the crisis in Sudan.¹¹³ However, relations between Chad Government and SAF deteriorated

¹⁰⁸ Interviews with members of the Sudanese and South Sudanese armed groups, South Sudanese politicians, Darfurians, Sudanese diaspora in Egypt and Turkey, April-July 2023.

¹⁰⁹ South Sudan, Ministry of Finance and Planning, first quarterly macroeconomic update 2022/23.

¹¹⁰ Interviews with members of the Sudanese and South Sudanese armed groups, South Sudanese politicians, June-December 2023.

¹¹¹ Interviews in person and by phone with SLA/AW, SPLM-N members, south Sudanese politicians and former ministers, Sudanese NGOs, oil traders in Juba, Nairobi and Kampala, October-November 2023.

¹¹² <https://nabsudan.com/?p=90600>.

¹¹³ <https://nabsudan.com/?p=90852>.

drastically after the SAF accused Chad of facilitating military support to RSF (see paragraph 41).¹¹⁴

C. Central African Republic

143. The conflict in Sudan had implications for the Darfur – CAR border area, including flows of fighters and weapons (see paragraphs 50-52) and cross border trade. At the beginning of conflict, the CAR contingent of the tripartite forces of 90 soldiers remained trapped in Am Dafok area, on the Sudanese side of the border, before being able to withdraw. On 17 May, RSF captured Am Dafok, the main border post with CAR. This facilitated RSF's recruitment in north east CAR amongst Arab border communities, according to various sources in both countries.¹¹⁵
144. In April – May, the economic situation in north-eastern CAR deteriorated quickly because of the crisis in Sudan. Widespread insecurity in South Darfur meant that the flows of agricultural goods and fuel from Sudan to CAR stalled. This led to price increases and shortages of supplies, particularly in Birao and Ndélé areas, pushing Central African local traders to procure fuel in Uganda.¹¹⁶
145. Control of the border by RSF after May resulted in an increase of cross border trade, according to Sudanese and Central African traders interviewed by the Panel. Local traders reported to the Panel that RSF negotiated with local border communities to guarantee safe, unhindered passage of goods, from which RSF benefited by levying security taxes. The markets in South Darfur, for instance in Am Dafok and Sungu, re-opened to supply the north-east of CAR with fuel and consumer goods.¹¹⁷

D. Libya

146. The conflict in Sudan had an impact on the security of southern part of Libya, when the General Command of General Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA) declared closure of the southern border on 25 April and deployed reinforcements to the border.¹¹⁸ The LNA authorities were mainly concerned that some Sudanese fighters may flee from North Darfur to southern Libya, which could further destabilize the area.
147. Cross-border trade between Libya and Darfur stopped at the end of April 2023. It resumed with commercial trucks heading from Kufra to El Fasher, in May. The price of diesel per litre in southern Libya was USD 10 at the time of writing, while in Darfur it was USD 25, which fuelled smuggling of this key good from Libya to Darfur, including for the resupply of Sudanese warring parties.
148. Several major Darfuri armed groups based in Libya took advantage of the chaotic situation in Sudan to return to Darfur and Khartoum areas, including SLA/AW and several SRAC factions. However, several JPA signatory groups maintained forces in Libya.

XI. Travel Ban

149. In paragraph 3(d) of resolution 1591 (2005), the Security Council imposed travel ban and asset freezing on four individuals, one of them being Musa Hilal Abdalla Alnsiem (permanent reference number SDi. 002). During the reporting period, the Panel received verified reports that Musa Hilal travelled to Chad in November 2023, by road, and reached

¹¹⁴ <https://sudantribune.com/article280273/>.

¹¹⁵ <https://oubanguimedias.com/2023/05/02/conflits-au-soudan-des-soldats-centrafricains-membres-des-forces-tripartites-en-difficulte>; interviews with interlocutors from West and South Darfur, in Kampala, Cairo, Nairobi May-June 2023.

¹¹⁶ Interviews with Sudanese, Ugandan, Kenyan traders and businessmen in Kampala and Nairobi, May-June 2023.

¹¹⁷ Interviews in person and by phone with businessmen from CAR, South Darfur, SPLM-N in Juba, Nairobi, October-November 2023.

¹¹⁸ <https://www.libyareview.com/33929/libyan-army-closes-border-with-sudan/>.

the capital N'Djamena, where he held private meetings. Hilal remained in Chad at the time of writing. Hilal's visit to Chad constituted a violation of the travel ban provisions.

XII. Recommendations

150. The Panel recommends that the Sanctions Committee on the Sudan:

1. Remind the parties to the conflict in Darfur to adhere to their obligations under international humanitarian law, including their obligations to protect civilians from violence, including women and children from sexual violence, and children from recruitment into their armed forces; and remind the warring parties that those who commit violations of international humanitarian law or other atrocities may be subject to targeted sanctions measures in accordance with paragraph 3 (c) of resolution 1591 (2005).
2. Remind the warring parties and those who facilitate the transfers of arms and military materiel to Darfur of their obligations to comply with the arms embargo measures as stipulated in paragraph 7 and 8 of resolution 1556 (2004); and reiterate that those who breach the arms embargo may be designated for targeted measures in accordance with paragraph 3 (c) of resolution 1591 (2005).

X. Annexes

Annex 1: Arms and ammunition used during the violence in El Geneina

1. In their attacks on El Geneina, RSF and allied militias, in addition to using assault rifles and 12.7 and 14.5 calibre machines guns, also deployed heavier calibre weapons such as mortars, and rocket launchers.¹¹⁹
2. On 13 May, several local sources saw RSF members using a heavy gun mounted on a Landcruiser vehicle, in Al Madaris neighbourhood. Cartridges of 30x165mm High Explosive Round were found on the site after the vehicle left. Such ammunition is customarily used on aircraft guns, such as those equipping the Sukhoi and Mig in possession of SAF Air Force. Most likely, RSF, who are not known for having had access to aircraft guns, looted such guns from SAF during a battle, and fixed them on Landcruisers as anti-aircraft system.

Photo of a 30x165mm High Explosive Round cartridge, El Geneina, May 2023



Source: Confidential

3. From 12 May 2023 onwards, RSF and allied militias begun extensively using RPG-7 rocket launchers, mortars (60mm, 100mm and 120mm), and heavy rockets such as 107mm Type 63-2, a high-explosive surface-to-surface rocket, as illustrated by various videos of fighters, testimonies, and remnants of ammunition. Mortars in particular were used to target gathering sites in places such as Al Madaris areas.

¹¹⁹ Cartridges, ammunition and unexploded ordnance collected by local civilians were inspected by the Panel.

Photo 5: Photo of remnants of RPG-7 ammunition (right) and of remnants of 60 and 100 / 120mm mortars (left), El Geneina, May 2023



Source: Confidential

Photo 6: Photo of remnants of 1989-produced 107mm Type 63-2 rocket, El Geneina, June 2023




Source: Confidential

4. Sudanese Alliance (SA), a JPA signatory movement, had about 25 vehicles based in El Geneina, mounted with 12.7mm and 14.5mm machine guns, and also had RPG-7, according to local sources and videos of the clashes.¹²⁰ In early May, SA fighters started to run short of ammunition which led them to withdraw from the town on 14 June. In general, ammunition shortage was the main issue for SA as well as for Masalit self-defence groups.

¹²⁰ About 13 cars for Bukhari Abdallah's faction, about 9 for Wali, about 5 for Bahar Karama and about 4 for Abdu Al-Khlikh Dodeen.

Annex 2: Destruction and attacks in Zalingei

Map of IDP camps, with an overlay of verified fire and infrastructure damage from April until November 2023 in Zalingei, Central Darfur.



Sources: OpenStreetMap contributors, IOM DTM Round 6, Annotations by the Centre for Information Resilience (CIR).



Satellite imagery showing fire and infrastructure damage in Hasahisa IDP camp, Zalingei. Obtained: 08 Jan 2023 (left), 11 Nov 2023 (right). Sources: Planet Labs PBC, Annotations by the Centre for Information Resilience (CIR).



Satellite imagery showing active fire [12.90985,23.45163] and damage to infrastructure [12.91139, 23.45236] in Hasahisa IDP camp, Zalingei. Obtained: 08 Jan 2023 (left), 11 Nov 2023 (right). Sources: Planet Labs PBC, Annotations by the Centre for Information Resilience (CIR).



Satellite imagery showing burn scars in and around shelters in Hasahisa IDP camp, Zalingei. [12.91849,23.45597] Obtained: 08 Jan 2023 (left), 11 Nov 2023 (right). Sources: Planet Labs PBC, the Centre for Information Resilience (CIR).




Satellite imagery showing damage to school buildings [12.90880,23.46955], government buildings [12.90956,23.47069], and civilian property [12.91046,23.46811] in Al Hai Al Gharbi, Zalingei. Obtained: 08 Jan 2023 (left), 11 Nov 2023 (right). Sources: Planet Labs PBC, Annotations by CIR.



Satellite imagery showing damage to Zalingei University, School of Agriculture buildings east of Zalingei [12.93356,23.50195]. Obtained: 02 Mar 2023 (left), 11 Nov 2023 (right). Sources: Planet Labs PBC, Annotations by CIR.

Annex 3: Destruction in El Geneina

map of IDP camps, with proximity to SAF & RSF bases and overlay of verified damage to infrastructure and IDP gathering sites from between 15 April to November 2023 in El Geneina, West Darfur.



Sources: *OpenStreetMap contributors, IOM DTM Round 6, Annotations by the Centre for Information Resilience (CIR).*



Satellite imagery of fire damage at IDP gathering locations and infrastructure damage west of El Geneina. Obtained: 19 April 2023 (left), 17 November 2023 (right). Sources: *Google Earth, Airbus DS, Planet Labs PBC, Annotations by the Centre for Information Resilience (CIR).*



2
 Satellite imagery of fire damage at IDP gathering locations, Abuzar, El Hujjaj, Al Jamarik IDP camps, and infrastructure damage in El Geneina. Obtained: 19 April 2023 (left), 17 November 2023 (right). Sources: Google Earth, Airbus DS, Planet Labs PBC, Annotations by the Centre for Information Resilience (CIR).



2
 Satellite imagery of fire damage at IDP gathering locations and infrastructure damage in Majlis and Al Tadamon neighbourhoods, El Geneina. Obtained: 19 April 2023 (left), 17 November 2023 (right). Sources: Google Earth, Airbus DS, Planet Labs PBC, Annotations by the Centre for Information Resilience (CIR).



3
 Satellite imagery of fire and infrastructure damage in Al Nahda North and Al Zuhur neighbourhoods, east El Geneina. Obtained: 19 April 2023 (left), 17 November 2023 (right). Sources: Google Earth, Airbus DS, Planet Labs PBC, Annotations by the Centre for Information Resilience (CIR).

Annex 4: Satellite imagery showing damage to Nyala



Satellite imagery showing damage to the Nyala Grand Market area east of SAF 16th Infantry Division command. Obtained: 08 Apr 2023 (left), 24 October 2023 (right). Sources: Google Earth, Airbus DS, Planet Labs PBC, Annotations by the Centre for Information Resilience (CIR).



Satellite imagery showing damage to Nyala Military Hospital and surrounding buildings in Al Gomhuria neighbourhood, central Nyala. Obtained: 08 Apr 2023 (left), 24 October 2023 (right). Sources: Google Earth, Airbus DS, Planet Labs PBC, Annotations by the Centre for Information Resilience (CIR).



Satellite imagery showing damage to government and educational buildings in Karari East neighbourhood, Nyala, southeast from the SAF 16 Infantry Division. Obtained: 08 Apr 2023 (left), 24 October 2023 (right). Sources: Google Earth, Airbus DS, Planet Labs PBC, Annotations by the Centre for Information Resilience (CIR).

Annex 5: Letter addressed to the Panel from the Permanent Representative of the UAE to the United Nations

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK



البعثة الدائمة
للإمارات العربية المتحدة
لدى الأمم المتحدة
نيويورك

Ref. 2023/1087

21 December 2023

Ms. Bernal,

I write in reference to your letter Ref. S/AC.47/2023/PE/OC.34 dated 14 December 2023, which makes several requests for information and seeks a response by 21 December 2023. At the outset, I wish to reiterate the United Arab Emirates' continued commitment to comply with its obligations under the sanctions regime established by the Security Council, as well as its continued support for the mandate of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan (Panel) and commitment to cooperate with the Panel.

Mindful of the very short timeframe provided by the Panel, on behalf of the concerned authorities in the United Arab Emirates, I am writing to provide the following responses to the Panel's requests for information.

The United Arab Emirates emphasizes that since the beginning of the conflict, it has played an active role in de-escalation efforts in Sudan, supported peaceful political options, as well as all initiatives put forward in this regard.

The United Arab Emirates further emphasizes that flights from the United Arab Emirates transported humanitarian assistance to assist Sudanese civilians displaced by the conflict in Sudan and the people of Amdjarass. This included medicines and medical equipment necessary to operationalise the United Arab Emirates field hospital, as well as food, tents, and well-drilling equipment. There have been 122 flights from the UAE carrying a total of 2,500 tonnes of

humanitarian aid. In addition to establishing the field hospital, the United Arab Emirates' humanitarian assistance has included rehabilitating three schools in Amdjarass, drilling three water wells, refurbishing four mosques, and providing three mobile clinics, two ambulances, 4,389 food parcels, 1,000 school bags, 1,000 tents, 950 outdoor solar lights, 2,004 blankets and cloths, 30 computers and 10 sewing machines for capacity-building and training, and 1,016 Qur'ans.

The United Arab Emirates would welcome, should the Panel of Experts wish, a visit to the United Arab Emirates field hospital, to learn about the humanitarian efforts undertaken by the United Arab Emirates.

With respect to the Panel's investigations regarding financial networks, the Panel's requests for information have been transmitted to the concerned authorities in the United Arab Emirates. The concerned authorities in the United Arab Emirates confirmed that Al Khaleej bank is not licensed to engage in any activity in the United Arab Emirates.

I thank the Panel of Experts for their cooperation, and I ask that the above response be reflected in full in the Panel's upcoming report.