New security pact inflames regional tensions
New security pact inflames regional tensions
What an Egyptian alliance with Somalia means for Sudan and the Horn
ANALYSIS
Egypt has pledged to send as many as 10,000 troops to Somalia under a security pact announced in mid-August, replacing 10,000 Ethiopian troops deployed in Somalia to fight Al-Shabaab militants.
As part of this deal, Egypt already sent two military aircraft to Mogadishu last week carrying weapons and ammunition, according to Reuters.
Egypt’s intervention in Somalia contrasts with its neutral and ambivalent approach to the Sudan conflict. However, the move also signals newfound Egyptian assertiveness that might make an eventual intervention in Sudan more likely.
This deployment would be the largest Egyptian military operation outside of Egypt since Gamal Abdel Nasser’s intervention in Yemen in 1962, and Mohamed Ali’s invasion of Sudan in 1820.
Of course, it remains to be seen if the Egyptian deployment will actually happen, and if so, what impact it will have on Somalia and the region. Preliminarily, however, we can already make several conclusions about Egyptian strategic thinking.
Water rights paramount
First, Egypt’s intervention in Somalia signals that Nile water rights remain its paramount strategic concern—more so than concerns over mass refugee flows from Sudan, the Gaza crisis, or the risks of state collapse and Islamist militancy in Sudan.
Since 2011, Egypt and Ethiopia have clashed over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which Egypt fears will reduce its water supply. Ethiopia began a fifth phase of filling the dam in July, ignoring Egyptian objections.
By intervening in Somalia—supporting the Mogadishu government in its own ongoing dispute with Ethiopia—Cairo is escalating the pressure on Addis Ababa over the dam.
In a statement Sunday, Egypt’s foreign ministry announced that 13 years of negotiations over the mega-dam have come to an end, saying, “it became clear to everyone that Addis Ababa wishes only to maintain an endless negotiation process as a cover to conceal its ulterior purpose of entrenching a fait accompli.”
The statement further stressed that “unlawful Ethiopian policies will have grave consequences on the two downstream states, Egypt and the Sudan,” adding, “Egypt’s Supreme Committee for the Nile convened last week, under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister, and reaffirmed Egypt's right to defend its water security and to take the requisite measures to achieve this end.”
Shared grievances against Ethiopia
Cairo’s intervention in Somalia coincides with a growing dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia. Although these two nations have long cooperated against the Al-Shabaab insurgency, the militant group aligned with Al Qaeda, relations have soured after Ethiopia signed a memorandum with separatist Somaliland.
Details of this deal are opaque, but reportedly Ethiopia offered to recognize Somaliland’s independence in exchange for 20 km of leased coastline on the Gulf of Aden, allowing landlocked Ethiopia to build its own port and naval base. Somaliland also would receive shares in Ethiopian state enterprises, such as Ethiopian Airlines.
Ethiopia last week sent an ambassador to Hargeisa, advancing recognition of the breakaway region.
Mogadishu, which asserts sovereignty over Somaliland, has retaliated by threatening to expel Ethiopian troops from Somalia, demanding the cancellation of the port deal. Ethiopia has about 3,000 troops deployed in Somalia as part of an African Union mission, plus 5,000-7,000 deployed independently under bilateral agreements.
Dispute “endangers gains made against terrorist groups”
Ethiopia’s deployment in Somalia is motivated in part by concerns of attacks within its own borders; Ethiopia has a substantial Somali population of its own and is a declared enemy of Al-Shabaab. An attack on a seaside hotel in Mogadishu a month ago, killing and wounding dozens, demonstrates the persistent Al-Shabaab threat.
If tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia persist, counter-insurgency cooperation between the two countries could be curtailed. Egyptian troops presumably would be looking to fill this void, deploying in areas currently controlled by Ethiopian forces or helping Somali national troops to do so.
Addis Ababa is concerned about losing its foothold in Somalia, questioning whether Egyptian troops can effectively replace its own forces without creating a security vacuum. Ethiopia’s foreign ministry issued a press statement August 28, shortly after the arrival of the first Egyptian weapons in Mogadishu. Without mentioning Egypt by name, the statement accused the Government of Somalia of “colluding with external actors aiming to destabilize the region.”
The statement expressed concerns about plans for scaling down the African Union mission in Somalia, including its own troop contingent, while implicitly criticizing Egypt and warning that the dispute could hamper the fight against Al Shabaab:
“Repeated calls by Ethiopia and other Troop Contributing Countries have not been taken seriously. Ethiopia is being expected to ignore hostile statements, and the continued attempt to undermine the sacrifices of the Ethiopian defense forces. Ethiopia cannot stand idle while other actors are taking measure to destabilizing the region… All those responsible for preparing and authorizing a new peace support mission must take into account the legitimate concerns of countries of the region and the [Troop Contributing Countries]. Forces trying to inflame tension for their short-term and futile objectives must shoulder the grave ramifications. Ethiopia cannot tolerate these actions that endanger the gains made against regional and international terrorist groups.”
Ethiopian forces have been involved in Somalia since 2006, when they invaded to topple the Union of Islamic Courts, before withdrawing in 2009. They returned in 2011 as part of an African Union mission aimed at countering the rise of Al-Shabaab. Their departure would mark the end of an era for both Ethiopia and Somalia.
Major turning point for Egypt
Egypt’s new security pact with Somalia is also significant for Egypt itself, signaling renewed assertiveness on the global stage after a period of economic turmoil and inward focus.
In recent years, Egypt has suffered high inflation and stagnant economic growth, partly as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic. This briefly led to fears that Egypt could default on its considerable sovereign debt. Egypt’s fiscal woes dimmed the country’s international prestige and dulled its appetites for foreign adventures.
During the Covid years, Egypt scaled back its involvement in neighboring Libya and continued negotiating with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, amid periods of diplomatic calm. Last year, Egypt withdrew air force personnel from Sudan, after the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) briefly captured the Merowe airfield.
“Egypt’s security pact with Somalia signals renewed assertiveness on the global stage after a period of economic turmoil and inward focus.”
As the crisis in Sudan escalated throughout 2023, Egypt offered the Sudanese government rhetorical support but little more. Meanwhile, in February 2024, Egypt ended a decade of tensions with Türkiye, announcing a “new stage in relations” during a visit by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Cairo. The two nations had supported different sides in the Libyan and Syrian civil wars.
Again, these developments coincided with a period of domestic economic turmoil in Egypt, reflecting an inward focus and a desire to resolve international disputes amicably through diplomatic means and international economic cooperation.
Egypt’s new security pact with Somalia therefore represents a major turning point in its foreign policy. Diplomatically, it marks a major escalation with both Ethiopia and Somaliland. Militarily, the deal threatens to draw Egypt into a protracted and deadly conflict with Al-Shabaab. And financially, the deal represents a significant commitment, due to the potential cost of an overseas deployment of troops.
Egypt’s newfound assertiveness is underpinned by recent financial infusions of financial capital from the EU, the US, and the Gulf, which stabilized its currency and brought down the cost of government borrowing. Additionally, Egypt’s prominent role in mediating the Gaza conflict has further enhanced its international profile.
Cairo views Sudan as weak and unreliable
In this context, Egypt is reevaluating its regional alliances. While it views Somalia as a potential committed ally, which will support Egypt’s strategic goals over the long term, Cairo regards the Sudanese government as weak and unreliable. Over the past 13 years, Egypt has sought Sudan’s backing in its campaign against Ethiopia’s Renaissance Dam, but Sudan’s inconsistent stance has undermined this alliance.
Cairo recognizes Lt-Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan as Sudan’s legitimate leader but is wary of Islamist influences in Burhan’s government. Egypt provided the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) with little military aid, prompting SAF to seek assistance from Iran instead.
Moreover, Cairo has lost confidence that SAF can restore order in Sudan through military means. Egypt is now supporting mediation efforts led by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. Egypt’s intelligence chief recently visited Port Sudan, making personal efforts to bridge differences between the Sudanese government and the U.S. mediators.
Despite persistent rumors of Egyptian military support for the Sudan Armed Forces, Cairo remains wary of deepening its involvement in Sudan’s civil war, preferring a negotiated settlement between the SAF and the RSF.
This calculus could change if the RSF make further gains in the Nile Valley, triggering a larger refugee crisis and putting the paramilitary in control of key riparian infrastructure. The RSF already control one major dam on the Nile (Jebel Aulia Dam south of Khartoum), and they are within striking distance of two more (Sennar and Roseires). At present, seasonal rains are limiting the fighting and have halted RSF advances.
Given Egypt’s concerns over water rights, the potential emergence of the RSF as a new riparian power could force Egypt to rethink its neutrality. Its strategic options include continuing its mediation efforts, escalating its military support to SAF, or a direct military intervention.
The first option remains the most likely scenario for now, while the latter two become more likely in the longer term. In the meantime, Egypt’s deployment in Somalia will be a testing ground for future operations in Sudan.
The success or failure of this intervention will shape Egyptian strategic thinking and public attitudes. If the Somalia mission turns out to be a flop (or never happens at all), then Egypt could revert to a period of isolation and inward focus. But if it succeeds in its strategic aims, forcing Ethiopia to make concessions, this would be celebrated in Cairo and could set a precedent for other foreign interventions, including in Sudan.