Summary
Nearly two years of civil war in Sudan have caused state institutions to collapse across much of the country. The governance vacuum is worsening as the war continues, and the warring parties lack domestic and international support and legitimacy.
This creates an opportunity for a civilian government-in-exile to step into the gap. Such a government-in-exile could do more than merely make speeches and prepare for a post-war transition; it could provide actual government services both remotely, in refugee camps, and perhaps even in some territories of Sudan itself. It could have a diplomatic corps, small and highly functional ‘ministries,’ and a legal and judicial wing preparing for post-war prosecutions of war criminals.
For such a government to succeed, it would have to be relentlessly pragmatist and decisive, much more so than the current ‘Taqaddum’ coalition. By taking up this challenge, the anti-war opposition in Sudan would find purpose, win legitimacy, and erode the political claims that the warring parties use to legitimize their violence.
Moreover, the mere existence of such a self-proclaimed government could create leverage for peace. Neutral countries, by threatening to recognize the government-in-exile, would be able to pressure the warring parties to accept a ceasefire.
Such governments are not without precedent. For example, modern France is rooted in the government-in-exile led by Charles de Gaulle during World War Two, and the current Libyan government in Tripoli originated as a government-in-exile formed in 2011 before the fall of Muammar Gaddafi.
Political Context
Sudan was once the largest country in Africa, but it ceded that title to Algeria after South Sudan won its independence in 2011, following a long civil war. The independence of the South did not end Sudan’s troubles. Wars continued in Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, and Blue Nile State, and economic problems multiplied, until mass protests brought down the dictatorship of Omar al-Bashir in 2019, resulting in a brief period of peace and hopes for reform. For the first time in 30 years, Sudan had a civilian-led government committed to investing in education, social services, and infrastructure, rather than repressive security services and military hardware.
But the new government was also fractious and inexperienced, and it could not change the country’s lackluster economy overnight, nor fully uproot the old ways of thinking, which remained prevalent in the military and other centers of influence. Al-Bashir’s generals resented the reforms that the new government attempted to implement. They retook power in a military coup in 2021, supported by the Darfur Arab paramilitary, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which is known colloquially as the ‘Janjaweed.’
Al-Bashir himself, aged and discredited, did not play a role in the 2021 coup, but the new military regime halted prosecutions of him and his top lieutenants. The former ruling party, the National Congress (affiliated with the Sudanese Islamic Movement), which had been dissolved, began to emerge from the shadows, alongside other new, emerging Islamist parties. The army’s top general and the RSF’s commander-in-chief ruled side-by-side as chairman and deputy chairman, respectively, of a military junta (the Transitional Sovereignty Council) until April 2023, when they turned on each other, marking the start of the current civil war.
“The warring parties are united in trying to erase the legacy of the 2019 revolution.”
After nearly two years of war, Sudan is now divided into different zones of military control and influence. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) control the most territory, but the old Darfur rebel groups and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), which never disarmed after the 2019 revolution, also have substantial zones of control or influence.
These groups have different ideologies, different ethnic and regional constituencies, sources of economic power, and international backers. The principal warring parties, the RSF and SAF, both have national ambitions, though each has its own regional base of support. These two groups are the most committed, for now, to pursuing a “military solution,” and the least likely to accept any political settlement.
The Darfur armed groups likewise have national aspirations and political demands, to varying degrees, though they are limited by their smaller size and their narrow ethnic constituencies. Two armed groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement faction of Abdel Wahid al-Nur (which controls the Jebel Marra highlands in Darfur), and the SPLM-North, which controls the Nuba Mountains, are somewhat autarkic in their politics and policies, though not strictly separatist.
Further partition of Sudan is thus not the answer. Nobody wants that. A political settlement is hypothetically possible. Such a deal would need to accommodate some of the demands of the warring parties and eviscerate others, while creating conditions for a long process of demilitarization.
At the same time, peace appears out of reach for the time being, and the humanitarian situation is worsening. Although Sudan has avoided a deep famine, as some feared would happen earlier this year, localized famine emerged in some areas, and millions of Sudanese are unemployed, homeless, and hungry. The risk of famine could return next year. Government services have collapsed or fallen into disarray across much of the country, including the healthcare and education systems.
As the crisis deepens, the shadow of Al-Bashir looms large over Sudan. The warring parties have reverted to old, entrenched ways of governing that they learned during the Bashir era. Rather than invest in public services to win legitimacy and public support, they have poured all their financial resources and political capital into fueling the war, repressing opponents, and securing military resources. Rather than broaden their bases of support through political accommodation and the respecting of political freedoms and diversity, they have amplified regional and ethnic prejudices and hate speech and ruthlessly repressed dissent. Rather than turn to the African Union or the West for help in resolving the conflict, they have revived the paranoid and xenophobic rhetoric and foreign policy of the Bashir era.
The warring parties also are united in trying to erase the legacy of the “Glorious Revolution,” the 2018-2019 protest movement that toppled Al-Bashir. Though some members of the SAF or RSF pay lip service to the revolution, overall their war propaganda has the effect of replacing memories of the heroes of the protest era with a new kind of hero: their own soldiers. Rather than non-violent protesters, who were lionized in the 2019-2021 interim period, the heroes of the new era are killers and warriors.
The war has thus given Al-Bashir’s generals, and Al-Bashir’s longtime paramilitary ally, the RSF, a chance to reframe the revolution, undermine the transformational changes that it brought about (temporarily), and revert to the old ways of governing through violence and repression.
Rationale & Functions of a Government-in-Exile
The culture of militarism and violence in Sudan is deep-rooted. The country is awash in weapons, grievances, and divisions. Attempts to impose a peace deal on Sudan from outside will not succeed, just as attempts to achieve “peace” through military means are doomed to fail.
Instead, Sudanese must be offered an alternative. They must begin to see and experience what non-violent governance could look like. A new government-in-exile could begin to show them that. While realistically admitting to its own limitations, it could make serious efforts to provide real services, including the ones listed below.
The legitimacy and unity of such a government would be fragile and contested from the beginning. But its legitimacy and power would grow over time as it implemented concrete projects and initiatives aimed at mitigating the effects of the war and planning for a post-conflict transition.
The following programs could be implemented rapidly, with or without international financial support:
Preparing for war crimes prosecutions
The government-in-exile can appoint prosecutors to investigate war crimes perpetrated by both sides. Given the sheer number of war crimes, there is plenty of work to do already, starting with defining procedures and methods, gathering visual evidence, and identifying witnesses and victims.
Suspects can be tried after the war, or, if it continues indefinitely, the government-in-exile could set up courts to try suspects in absentia.
This office could receive funding or in-kind support from foreign legal organizations for the purpose of training lawyers, judges, and prosecutors.
Reparations and victim services:
The UN Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan has recommended creating an office of reparations and victim services. The government-in-exile can claim that role for itself by setting up a team to beginning to collect victim testimonies and reparation claims.
International human rights organizations may be interested in partnering with the government-in-exile to fulfill this task. This task force (or ministry or department, whatever the preferred terminology) could also undertake visits to various post-conflict countries to study their experiences.
Information and communication technology:
Digital infrastructure is important in all countries worldwide, and Sudan’s digital infrastructure can be built even while the country is at war.
Websites of many Sudanese government ministries are down, outdated, or never functioned well to begin with. A new government-in-exile could quickly establish websites to replace or compete with those of the old government, which would serve both practical and political purposes.
Passport and consular services
Many Sudanese have become refugees and internally displaced, and they sometimes have difficulty obtaining identity documents, educational certifications, etc. Additionally, Sudanese are sometimes discriminated against in neighboring countries or overseas. A government-in-exile could set up embassies specialized in the issuance of passports and the provision of other consular services.
Clearly, documents issued by an unrecognized government wouldn’t initially have much value for travelers. But they are at least some form of identity document, which is better than nothing, and they could gain more recognition with time.
Culture and antiquities:
Universities and cultural institutions in many countries have budgets for student exchange programs, scholarships, visiting scholars or artists, and international academic partnerships. A government-in-exile could help facilitate such programs by establishing “ministries” for culture and higher education.
These ministries also could play a role in tracking stolen or missing artifacts.
Educational services:
Sudan’s education system is in disarray. A government-in-exile could create digital resources for out-of-school children and their parents, as well as booklets that could be circulated in refugee camps and, where possible, in-country.
It also could develop post-war education strategies and curricula, including war-related lessons about the risks from explosive remnants of war, psychological trauma, and other topics. Curriculum writers also should consider including history lessons about the crimes of the former regime and the 2019 uprising.
Political and media:
The anti-war civilian opposition currently has difficulty articulating its purpose and identity; it says that it wants to end the war, but it is unclear how. It says it wants to undermine the legitimacy of both warring parties, but it offers no immediate alternative.
Foreign journalists will be more interested in speaking with a self-proclaimed “government-in-exile” than with a vague civilian coalition whose purpose is unclear. Similarly, foreign governments, though perhaps initially hostile or ambivalent to the idea of a government-in-exile, might eventually recognize it.
By appointing a foreign minister and claiming to fully represent the Sudanese state, the government-in-exile could build legitimacy during every international visit, while pressuring and undermining the warring parties.
Neither the RSF nor the SAF have a strong claim to legitimacy internationally, so starting from zero is not the enormous disadvantage that it may appear to be.
Humanitarian affairs:
Although the government-in-exile initially would control no territory on the ground, it could help with humanitarian efforts indirectly by using local connections to support humanitarian tracking and reporting, in cooperation with others already involved in this effort.
Opportunities could arise to help with negotiating humanitarian access.
Small impact projects and fundraising campaigns could win support for the government while amplifying grassroots humanitarian efforts.
Oversight of energy, mining, and other economic sectors:
Sudan’s economy under the government of Omar al-Bashir was notoriously opaque, and the warring parties today continue to exploit the country’s natural resources for their economic gain, and to fuel the war. The government-in-exile could set up investigative teams to look into the uses of revenues from oil, gold mining, and other commodity exports, and to address safety issues, environmental issues, and labor conditions.
Reporting and advocacy around these issues could create internal pressure for economic reforms and greater transparency, and it could deter foreign exploiters of these resources.
Such projects also would prepare the government for the regular auditing and transparency work that will be necessary after the war ends.
Stakeholders in a Government-in-Exile
Sudan’s doctors, lawyers, engineers, and other professional associations played a huge role in the 2019 uprising, and in the transition that followed. These professional classes, and the diaspora, would be critical to implementing a government-in-exile. They have the skills and professional experiences to create effective institutions. Though they are divided in their political loyalties, or simply disillusioned by politics in general, they can be united by common purpose, as evidenced by the 2019 protests.
On the other hand, Sudan’s longtime political opposition parties have difficulty ever uniting about anything. This is a class of professional politicians that is accustomed more to maneuvering and politicking than to governing. They will seek titles and privileges, while offering little of practical value to a government-in-exile.
“The class of professional opposition politicians must… step aside for a new generation of reformers, experts, and innovators to lead the effort.”
At the same time, these politicians sometimes represent real and substantial constituencies. Their support would lend legitimacy to the enterprise, but it would also amplify questions about representation and the allocation of power and positions within the new government.
For these reasons, this class must not be allowed to dictate the decisions of the government-in-exile. These politicians could play a role, but they should not be a driving force. They must step aside for a new generation of reformers, experts, and innovators to lead the effort.
Nor should the government-in-exile strive to represent “the broadest coalition possible.” This has been a key goal of the Taqaddum bloc, the current alliance of the civilian anti-war opposition. But broadening its political coalition has not enhanced Taqaddum’s popularity or perceived legitimacy. Taqaddum instead is plagued by questions of leadership, representation, and legitimacy.
A new government-in-exile would face similar questions:
“Who leads this so-called ‘government’?”
“Who elected you? What gives you any legitimacy?”
“What interest groups or political parties do you represent?”
“How democratic are you internally?”
“Which warring party do you support?”
“If you don’t control any territory, how are you relevant?”
The way to resolve these questions, in my opinion, is by focusing on a different question: “What would this new government be doing?” It is not through the identity of its leaders, nor through the breadth of its coalition, nor how democratic its internal processes are, that a government-in-exile would win or lose legitimacy, but rather through its actions, through the concrete services that it provides.
The questions of structure, leadership, and representation all would need to be addressed. But these are secondary to the most important question: purpose. Sudan’s civilian opposition needs to get down to the business of governing. Only by stepping boldly into governing—that is, by taking up real-world challenges now, not waiting till the war is over—will the opposition gain a sense of purpose and unity.
Anyone bold enough to participate in this project should be realistic from the start that it might fail. A government-in-exile might not be able to implement anything of real value. It might not be fully representative, nor fully democratic. It might never win any authority inside Sudan. It might not win any international recognition.
But as the saying goes, “Don’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good.” To end this war, and to mitigate its catastrophic effects, Sudan’s professionals, and the civilian opposition parties, need to be more assertive and more ambitious. It is not possible to hold elections right now, nor to get rid of the warlords, nor to eliminate the distrust and long-standing political fissures that complicate the task of building a governing coalition. But that should not stop them from trying.
Sudan’s vying warlords cannot govern the country, now or in the future. They do not care about the children who are hungry, the students who are out of school, the women who are suffering miscarriages and malnutrition, the farmers who can’t cultivate their land, and the men who are dying in droves on the battlefield.
This situation is entirely unacceptable. The time for action is now. The time to start the post-war transition from soldiers to civilians is now.