A contrarian view of the UAE’s role in Sudan
The Emirates' military role is exaggerated while its political importance is under-appreciated
ANALYSIS
The United Arab Emirates is widely viewed as a spoiler in Sudan’s ongoing civil war, a patron of the renegade Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which have rampaged across cities, pillaging and raping.
Recent reports from a variety of sources have provided credible but non-conclusive evidence about the role of the UAE in supporting the RSF with weapons and materiel.
The Sudanese military have scapegoated the UAE for their military defeats as the hands of the RSF, and the UAE’s leaders are now widely despised by the Sudanese public. A common meme among Sudanese compares the UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed al-Nahyan with a devil figure painted by, oddly enough, an Italian revivalist painter, Giovanni Gasparro.
Meanwhile, a leaked report by a UN Panel of Experts concluded that allegations of UAE support for the RSF are “credible,” describing “large-scale and sustained” arms shipments, including light weapons, drones, anti-aircraft missiles, mortars, and ammunition. The report stated, “This new RSF firepower had a massive impact on the balance of forces, both in Darfur and other regions of Sudan.”
As an analyst and open source researcher who has followed the conflict closely since the beginning, I believe this is overstated. Although I agree that the UAE probably provided some weapons to the RSF, I respectfully disagree that this support has made a big difference militarily. The Emirates’ principal importance is political.
The RSF’s successes in the war so far are attributable to tactical superiority over the Sudan Armed Forces, the use of weaponry already acquired before the war, and vast stockpiles of weapons and ammunition captured from the regular army.
During nine months of open source monitoring, I have seen countless videos of RSF troops with captured tanks and armored vehicles—numbering in the hundreds—heavy artillery, mortars, ammunition, anti-aircraft weapons, armored cars, modified pickup trucks (“technicals”), and small arms. The biggest hauls came from the Yarmuk munitions factory, the Armored Corps base, the headquarters of the Central Reserve Police, and the headquarters of five captured infantry divisions.
By comparison, there is little if any visual evidence of weaponry provided by the UAE to the RSF since the start of the war. Armored cars and pickup trucks imported from the UAE date to the pre-war period.
UAE is weak and unprepared for a long proxy war
The UAE has money and access to international arms markets, but it is not a major military power—not even a minor military power, in fact. The UAE relies on foreign military equipment, advisors, and security guarantees; it has a tiny population, and its domestic arms industry is still young and unimportant in comparative terms.
Although the UAE’s military and security services gained experience in several recent international conflicts, including Iraq, Yemen, and Afghanistan, nearly all the UAE’s overseas military operations happened alongside Western militaries. This time, the West has no interest getting involved in Sudan, and the UAE is acting alone.
If the UAE continue supplying weapons to the RSF, this assistance necessarily will be limited and ineffective, and it will come with growing risk of international opprobrium for violating a UN arms embargo on Darfur. By contrast, the Sudan Armed Forces’ newly revived relationship with Iran is substantially more important militarily.
The West will not intervene if Sudan turns into a proxy war between Iran and the UAE—and it is a battle the UAE cannot win on its own. Due to its size and sophistication, Iran will ultimately triumph in a prolonged standoff between the two powers.
UAE’s political patronage of the RSF
Despite its limitations as a military power, the UAE plays an important role as a political patron of the RSF, and as a haven for the RSF’s media and political teams, as well as affiliated companies.
The UAE’s friendly posture toward the RSF feeds the false belief among the RSF leadership that they can take power by force and eventually gain international recognition. Feeding this delusion is the principal way in which the UAE have fueled the war in Sudan—and removing doubt of it would help end the conflict.
The relationship between the Emirates and the Sudanese paramilitary originated in the UAE’s recruitment of the RSF as a provider of mercenary manpower during its war in Yemen. It was a relationship between paymaster and mercenary.
By now, however, the relationship goes beyond that, involving personal, cultural, and ideological factors. Culturally, the RSF portray themselves as nomadic desert warriors, quintessential Arabs in the mode of the early Islamic conquerors, who are superior to non-Arab Africans and sedentary Sudanese Arabs. This hyper-militaristic, racist culture, though noxious, might appeal to some patrons in the Gulf.
Members of the Emirates’ security services may also feel some sort of feudal or personal loyalty to the RSF and its leader—a bond that they are loathe to sever, despite the RSF becoming a growing political liability.
“Feeding the RSF’s delusions of international recognition is the principal way in which the UAE have fueled the war in Sudan.”
There is also an ideological element at play, namely, the Emirates’ hostility toward the Muslim Brotherhood, and by extension, the Sudanese Political Islamists who hold substantial influence over the Sudan Armed Forces and General Intelligence Service.
It is difficult to know how much this figures in the UAE’s calculations. If they believe that supporting the RSF is a way of countering political Islam, they will soon find out that they are gravely mistaken. Taking sides in the war, rather than working for political solutions, only further destabilizes the country and risks its total breakup.
Militant political Islam is already growing in power in Sudan, exploiting the Sudanese army’s weakness as a pretext to build up its own armed wings. This is happening throughout the country’s north and east, the region bordering the Red Sea, which is a vital shipping corridor for the UAE and the broader global economy. Accelerating the defeat of the Sudan Armed Forces, or creating conditions for a prolonged war, will only help these radical groups.
The recent international tour of the RSF leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, may have been orchestrated in part by the UAE. The jet on which he travelled was registered in the UAE, and the high-level itinerary including meetings with heads of state in countries where the UAE exercises influence, but the RSF does not.
The Sudanese public and international observers widely viewed this tour as a whitewashing of the militia leader, a political stunt that did little to serve the interests of peace. During and after, the RSF continued to wage war and perpetrate war crimes.
Dagalo was greeted with fanfare by South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and Kenya’s William Ruto, among others. Such red-carpet treatment—which appeals to Dagalo’s craven desire for praise, power, and recognition—can only fuel his ambition to take power by force and rule Sudan as his personal fiefdom.
Critics therefore were rightly critical of the African leaders who received the Sudanese warlord. But viewed from another perspective, the tour was a step in the right direction. It may have been a genuine (albeit misguided) attempt by the RSF’s Gulf patrons to get Dagalo off the battlefield and prepare him for negotiations. Secret follow-up talks held afterwards in Manama, Bahrain, at the behest of the UAE, support this interpretation.
If indeed the UAE is engaging politically to end the war in Sudan, rather than intervening militarily, this is a welcome development. Yet the UAE’s intervention is doomed to fail unless they escalate the pressure on the RSF. Dagalo himself is not yet serious about peace, nor are his field commanders and the rank-and-file. They still believe in the possibility of military victory.
Subtle but firm pressure from the UAE could change the RSF’s calculus, advancing the cause for peace. For example, expelling a few members of the RSF media team in Dubai, or creating bureaucratic difficulties for RSF-linked companies, could generate enough concern within the RSF leadership to nudge them to the negotiating table. Meanwhile, the US, Saudi Arabia and Egypt could apply pressure on the other party, Sudan’s military junta.
Success in this scenario requires bringing both sides to the negotiating table under pressure. By working diplomatically for peace in Sudan, the UAE could help repair its tarnished image in Sudan and in the West. If, on the other hand, the UAE continues to support the Rapid Support Forces with weapons or political patronage, it risks fueling Sudan’s descent into chaos and creating a new opening for Iran on the Red Sea. Many Western and Middle Eastern capitals would blame the UAE for this outcome.
Doubt over UAE’s humanitarian investments
Lastly, the UAE’s humanitarian investments are worth examining in more detail. The UAE have built field hospitals in two locations in eastern Chad, while also providing tents, school bags, blankets, and food to refugees.
According to a letter from the UAE Permanent Mission to the UN Panel of experts on Darfur, dated December 21, “There have been 122 flights from the UAE carrying a total of 2,500 tonnes of humanitarian aid.” If not for suspicions that this was a cover for military airlift, this assistance ought to have been widely applauded.
The UAE could remove this shadow of suspicion by funneling more support through neutral humanitarian agencies. It should also cease military assistance to the Chadian military, or at least move it farther from the Sudanese border. This support, if it isn’t related to Sudan’s internal conflict, doesn’t have to happen at the Sudanese border.
A major shortfall in humanitarian funding is costing Sudanese lives, and donations by Arab nations including the UAE are needed to bolster flagging support by Western donors. Further support of this kind should be encouraged, not criticized—but not if the UAE is taking an active role in the conflict.