Sudan's RSF clashes with South Sudan’s SPLA-IO
Fighting in Renk County near border with Sudan's Blue Nile State
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Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) fought a two-day battle against the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO), a South Sudanese opposition group, near the border between the two countries.
The battle, which began on Saturday and ended on Sunday afternoon, saw RSF fighters engage SPLA-IO forces in an agricultural zone east of Renk in Upper Nile state and west of Bout, the capital of Blue Nile state’s Tadamon locality. The violence signals deepening ties between the RSF and South Sudan’s government, amid deteriorating relations between Juba and Port Sudan.
The fighting also indicates that the RSF is now operating from inside Renk County in South Sudan, likely with the sanction of the South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF). This follows the retreat of RSF units from the Mazmoum Enclave in southwestern Sennar State several weeks ago.
The RSF, which mutinied against the Sudanese government in 2023, captured swathes of central and southeastern Sudan last year, but has since been forced out by a Sudanese army counter-offensive, driving some RSF fighters across the border into South Sudan, while others have retreated westward to the RSF homeland, Darfur.
“We want to send a message to the Government of South Sudan, we swear by God that we are protecting your sovereignty and your people,” an RSF field commander boasted in a video after the fighting, as he sat next to a captured SPLA-IO fighter.
The governments of Sudan and South Sudan occasionally have sponsored proxy forces against each other, harboring or allying with rebels. For example, South Sudan allied with the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) after independence, resulting in active JEM operations along the border between the two countries in 2012-2014. This alliance boosted the South Sudanese government during a brief border war in the Heglieg oilfield area in 2012, and JEM also helped against SPLA-IO insurgents.
However, relations have been mostly peaceful between the two Sudans for about a decade. Recent months have seen a sharp deterioration in relations, as South Sudan faces an internal crisis and has drifted closer to the United Arab Emirates and the RSF.
According to sources who spoke to Sudan War Monitor, the latest fighting in Renk County began when RSF fighters ambushed an SPLA-IO unit in an open agricultural area about 51 kilometers southeast of Renk town. The SPLA-IO force, estimated at 400 men and led by senior commanders, came under attack in an area with sparse vegetation. Video footage shared by RSF fighters (included below) shows SPLA-IO troops scattering as RSF fighters in Toyota pickup trucks pursued them.
The exact circumstances of the clash remains unclear. However, multiple sources in South Sudan indicated that the SPLA-IO force had left Nasir a week earlier, allegedly heading to the Sudanese town of Bout to collect weapons offered by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), potentially to fuel the unfolding conflict in Nasir.
Based on these claims, RSF fighters ambushed the SPLA-IO near Dukduk, an agricultural village in Renk County. Dukduk, formerly a South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF) base, was seized by the SPLA-IO in mid-2021 and has since served as a strategic crossing point for the group into Sudan.
A senior SPLA-IO officer, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Sudan War Monitor that the unit attacked by RSF had been led by Major General Biel Goanar and Major General Gatwech Gai. Both were killed in the ambush.
“After the initial attack, Brigadier General Peter Parjiek Toang left Dukduk on a rescue mission but was ambushed, captured, and later executed along with other officers taken prisoner. Those killed in the clashes include Maj. Gen. Biel Goanar, Maj. Gen. Gatwech Gai, and Brig. Gen. Parjiek Toang. All three were part of Division One, originally stationed in Magennis. Following internal SPLA-IO divisions, they relocated to Dukduk, where they had remained.”
“Maj. Gen. Biel and Maj. Gen. Gatwech were ambushed while traveling from Maiwut. Brig. Gen. Parjiek, who was coming from Dukduk, was also ambushed, captured, and later executed,” the officer said.
In South Sudan’s military structure, a force of 400 troops is typically classified as a company, and is commanded by a major or colonel, rather than a major general. The fact that this particular unit was led by two major generals suggests it was assigned a high-priority mission — likely an effort to secure weapons.
A prisoner of war captured in the latest fighting, who was interviewed by an RSF commander on camera, said that he was recruited with other SPLA-IO soldiers in Pagak in Upper Nile State, adding that their force numbered 400, and that they were headed to Bout to receive weapons (from SAF). These details partly corroborate information from the other source.
The clashes underscore the growing complexity of Sudan’s war, with the RSF seemingly aligning itself with South Sudan’s government against opposition forces within South Sudan, and SAF potentially supporting South Sudanese rebels.
International Crisis Group, a think tank, highlighted this dynamic in a conflict alert March 7th, explaining,
“Hostilities in Upper Nile could be the first major violent spillover from Sudan’s war into South Sudan. The Sudanese military has a decades-long history of exploiting ethno-political fissures in South Sudanese society to fuel conflict. Crudely speaking, these pit the Dinka, [President] Kiir’s ethnic group and the nation’s largest, against the Nuer, [Vice President] Machar’s group and South Sudan’s second largest. Many South Sudanese and diplomats serving in the region suspect that the Sudanese army has reactivated its old ties to Nuer militias in Upper Nile and sent military supplies south, which would help explain the sudden eruption of fighting. Crisis Group’s own inquiries indicate that this notion is plausible.
The RSF’s emerging partnership with Kiir’s government marks a shift compared to earlier in the war, when the RSF were widely seen as being closer with the South Sudanese opposition, because the RSF recruited mercenaries from the ranks of South Sudanese opposition groups, including SPLA-IO.
The SPLA-IO, led by South Sudan’s First Vice President Riek Machar, is a key faction in South Sudan’s transitional government. The group, primarily composed of Nuer fighters – Machar’s ethnic group – fought the South Sudanese government from 2013 until 2018, when a peace deal brokered by then-Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir ended the hostilities.
Videos
RSF soldiers wearing captured South Sudanese (SPLA-IO) uniforms and insignia, boasting about defeating the SPLA-IO force. Several child soldiers are among them:
RSF soldiers capture SPLA-IO soldiers, force their surrender, and whip them:
RSF soldiers in a Land Cruiser combat vehicle shoot at fleeing SPLA-IO soldiers:
SPLM-IO prisoners of war in RSF custody in Renk County, South Sudan:
Background: Sudan-South Sudan Relations
Sudan and South Sudan share a complex and deeply intertwined history, shaped by decades of war, shifting alliances, and mutual dependencies. Even after South Sudan’s independence in 2011, both nations have remained entangled in each other’s crises, driven by security concerns, economic ties, and political rivalries.
From the 1983-2005 civil war, which culminated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and South Sudan’s secession, to the internal conflicts that followed, both countries have repeatedly supported each other’s enemies. During South Sudan’s civil war in 2013, Khartoum backed Riek Machar’s SPLA-IO rebels, while Juba armed Sudanese opposition groups such as the Justice and Equality Movement and the SPLM-North. These dynamics have continued despite official claims of neutrality.
When war erupted in Sudan in April 2023, South Sudan initially took a neutral stance. However, reports later indicated that Juba was quietly cutting deals with both sides. Elements within Kiir’s government have also engaged in trade with the RSF, purchasing weapons and looted vehicles while facilitating smuggling into RSF-controlled areas. In December, Sudans Post reported that South Sudan facilitated fuel shipments to the RSF through Northern Bahr el Ghazal.
Simultaneously, South Sudan was allowing the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) to use its airspace to repatriate troops that had fled onto its territory.
In January, South Sudanese civilians were reportedly killed by SAF and allied militias during the recapture of Wad Madani, triggering a wave of anti-Sudanese anger within South Sudan. Mutual distrust grew after the establishment of a UAE field hospital near the Sudanese border, which has raised speculation that it could serve as a strategic support hub for the RSF, similar to the role played by Amjaras Hospital in Chad.
On the other hand, South Sudan has been economically dependent on Sudan for many years, relying on its northern neighbor for oil exports through pipelines to the Red Sea, as well as for civil aviation and higher education services. But damage to this pipeline means that this binding tie is no longer as important.
President Kiir, who fought against Sudanese forces in two civil wars, has maintained a transactional relationship with the north, at times cooperating with Khartoum while other times working to undermine its leadership. Both sides deeply distrust each other, but are willing to do business together (or at least they have been in the past). Kiir’s recent warm reception of Abdel Fattah al-Burhan during a state visit in September 2024 reflects this ongoing balancing act.
