Resurgent Islamists stoke fears of ‘foreign conspiracy’ against Sudan
Ali Karti named leader of Islamist umbrella coalition
Political party activity inside Sudan has all but ceased, due to wartime conditions, military rule, and repression of opposition parties that step out of line. But the Islamist parties are a key exception, enjoying a major revival.
An umbrella group of Sudanese Islamist parties, the “Broad Islamic Current,” met yesterday and selected a Bashir-era official as their leader, Ali Karti, who promised an “ambitious program” for the coalition, according to a press release from the group. The statement also referred to a foreign conspiracy against Sudan, echoing a common talking point among supporters of the Sudanese military.
Karti is the former foreign minister and the secretary-general of the Sudanese Islamic Movement, which was closely tied with the former ruling party, the National Congress (NCP). He is the foremost member of the Bashir regime still active on the Sudanese political scene, apart from the military officers of the junta itself. The United States and European Union recently sanctioned him for undermining Sudan’s political transition after the 2019 revolution and for obstructing efforts to achieve a ceasefire.
Karti takes over from Omar al-Amin al-Hussein, leader of a smaller Islamist party. According to its charter, leadership of the Broad Islamic Current rotates among its ten constituent groups, a reflection of the fluid and decentralized nature of Sudan’s Islamist revival. Its leadership body meets frequently, every three to four months.
“In implementation of the basic law and commitment to the principle of Shura, the Presidential Council of the Broad Islamic Current held its regular meeting with its full membership on September 9, in which it discussed the developments in the country, and the repercussions of the war launched by the rebel Rapid Support militia, its foreign mercenaries, and its supporters from among the internal political forces and the countries conspiring against our country and our people.
“The [outgoing] head of the Broad Islamic Current, Mr. Omar Al-Amin Al-Hussein, presented a report on the work within the Current and the performance of its structures in the past period…”
The members unanimously agreed on the appointment of Karti, who leads the most influential of the ten member groups, the Islamic Movement. His appointment comes at a pivotal time for Sudan, ahead of fresh dry season fighting in October and amid mounting pressures from neighboring Arab states for a negotiated solution to the conflict. Thus far the military government, which is based at Port Sudan after losing control of the capital, has resisted pressure for a ceasefire, turning instead to Iran and China for military assistance.
Rise, fall, and return
Islamists were the dominant force in Sudanese politics from 1989 to 2019 during the rule of President Omar al-Bashir, but they lost power when huge street protests toppled the strongman. A transitional government (2019-2021) outlawed the former ruling party, the National Congress (aka the National Islamic Front), confiscated its assets, and prosecuted some of its leaders.
They also purged NCP loyalists from state media and other key organs of government. However, Islamist influences in the military, security services, and the private sector were deep-rooted and not so easily removed. The NCP began reemerging from the shadows in 2022, after a coup by Bashir’s generals, who ousted civilians from Sudan’s Transitional Sovereignty Council, turning it into a military junta.
The ostensibly apolitical generals turned up the heat on opposition parties while allowing the Islamist parties to operate and organize freely once again.
Nevertheless, the former ruling party cadres faced legal and political obstacles blocking their formal return to power. They were still haunted by the stigma of the revolution, which had severely dented their prestige and popularity. Sudanese opposition parties, including both leftists and the traditional parties, opposed the return of the NCP, as did the powerful trade unions and professional unions that had played a leading role in the street protests that toppled Bashir.
The NCP adapted and rebranded, operating through a variety of political affiliates and front groups, youth organizations, and armed affiliates, such as Sudan Shield and the Baraa Bin Malik Brigade. New Islamist leaders emerged alongside the old ones of the NCP. In April 2022, ten Islamist factions, including affiliates and front groups of the NCP, signed a charter launching the “Broad Islamic Current.”
The signatories included the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan; the Just Peace Platform; the Sudanese Islamic Front; the Renaissance Movement; the State of Law and Development Party; the Future Movement for Reform and Development; the Reform Now Movement; the National Justice Party; and the Islamic Unity Initiative.
Blame the foreigners
Last month, the Broad Islamic Current issued a statement urging Sudan’s military government to boycott U.S.-mediated ceasefire talks in Geneva, in order “to deprive the United States of the opportunity and avoid replicating the Libyan or Yemeni scenario.” They said, “It is necessary to search for international and regional alliances” to resist what it described as arrogance towards the Sudanese people.
Sudanese military propaganda typically focuses heavily on the United Arab Emirates, which allegedly supplied weapons to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and gave safe haven to its leaders. For example, in July, Lt Gen Yasser Al-Atta, Assistant Commander in Chief of the Sudan Armed Forces, condemned the UAE and insulted its ruler, saying, “Mohamed bin Zayed is the devil of the Arabs and a dirty Zionist.”
Focusing on alleged foreign enemies allows the military to deflect blame for its failures while portraying the war as a nationalist struggle against foreigners rather than a “generals’ war” between domestic factions.
Other scapegoats include Chad, South Sudan, and Israel. More recently, Sudan has also witnessed an increase in anti-American rhetoric, after the U.S. tried to bring Sudan’s warring parties to the negotiating table in Geneva.
Saudi Arabia, the United Nations, and even erstwhile allies like Egypt are occasionally targeted. Such rhetoric revives a conspiratorial, xenophobic strain in Sudanese politics and foreign policy that peaked in the 1990s and early 2000s.
In line with this worldview, supporters of the Sudanese military typically characterize the RSF as a foreign or mercenary organization, though it originated in western Sudan with the support of the Sudanese government, before it turned on the military in April 2023, triggering the current civil war. (There are some foreigners in the ranks of the RSF, particularly Chadian Arabs, but overwhelmingly the fighters are Sudanese nationals, particularly ethnic Arabs from the nomadic tribes of Darfur and Kordofan).
Colloquially, many Sudanese refer to the RSF as “Janjaweed,” which means “devils on horseback.” This refers to the RSF’s origins as local Arab militias in Darfur, armed by the Sudanese government. In the early 2000s, they used camels and horses, though now they mostly use pickup trucks, modified pickups (“technicals”), and motorcycles, as well as some armored cars and mobile artillery.
After defeating rebel movements in Darfur in the 2010s, the RSF were employed by the UAE as mercenaries in the Yemen conflict. Eventually, the RSF developed their own power base in Darfur, controlling gold mines, smuggling, and other lucrative businesses. Though closely allied with the Bashir regime, they were never fully under Khartoum’s control.
The RSF claim to be fighting for “democracy” and against Islamism. In their public statements, they consistently try to exploit international fears about militant Islam (the RSF’s alleged patron, the UAE, is particularly hostile to the Muslim Brotherhood) to win support for their cause. For example, they describe the Sudanese military as an “Islamic militia” and compare it to ISIS.
The majority of Sudanese, however, do not see the RSF as a viable alternative to the Islamists. Though militarily ascendant, the RSF are deeply unpopular throughout most of Sudan and politically isolated. RSF attacks on villages and cities in western and central Sudan have displaced millions of people, and the RSF are accused of horrific war crimes, including massacres, mass rape, mass arrests, torture, and pillaging.
Top general meets with Islamist commanders
In a related development, the Assistant Commander-in-Chief of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) Lieutenant General Yasser Al-Atta met in Omdurman with commanders of the Baraa Bin Malik Brigade, an Islamist paramilitary that operates with semi-official sanction, allied with the Sudanese military, but without any formal legal status.
He appeared alongside Al Misbah Abu Zeid Talha, leader of the paramilitary. In a statement on social media, the Baraa Bin Malik Brigade said, “The Assistant Commander-in-Chief and Member of the Sovereignty Council, His Excellency Lt Gen Yasser Abdul Rahman Hassan Al-Atta visited our forces in the Omdurman region and checked him on the position of the forces, their arrangements and our readiness.”
The Baraa Bin Malik Brigade follows in the footsteps of other jihadist brigades formed in the 1990s, known as the Popular Defense Forces, which fought alongside the Sudanese military in South Sudan and the Nuba Mountains. The brigade enjoys the financial and political patronage of the old guard Islamists but is led by a younger vanguard, savvier in the use of social media and with a proclivity for high-tech gadgets like drones and modified rocket systems.
The brigade has formed training camps and fighting units in several parts of the country, including Gedaref, Northern State, Red Sea State, White Nile, and Kassala.
Additionally, the Baraa Bin Malik Brigade announced yesterday that they would recruit “civil support battalions,” signaling an effort to spread their influence beyond the military into the civil service and professional fields. They asked for volunteers in the fields of healthcare, culture, education, entrepreneurship, agriculture, religious affairs, law, and youth and sports, urging volunteers to contact them through WhatsApp:
“These battalions are formed to awaken the general energies of the Sudanese people and employ them to serve the Battle of Dignity and lift the suffering from the shoulders of the sons of the homeland and revive the principle of social solidarity in all professional, service, humanitarian, and military support fields.”
Above: Pro-war propaganda video circulated by Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade.
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