The Sudan Armed Forces have gained ground in Omdurman in recent weeks, attacking from two directions to try to link up their forces in the northern part of the city with a besieged force in the central city.
The two-pronged attack has succeeded in bringing the two forces within about a kilometer of each other, compared to about 4 km prior to the current offensive. The gains, though at first only marginal, have accelerated over the past week.
The final corridor controlled by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) includes the Al Bosta neighborhood, Al Tijani Al Mahi Mental Hospital, and Khalifa Square. The RSF’s defense of the area is anchored by the Omdurman Industrial District on their western flank, and by the Nile on their eastern one. The army’s main force is coming from the north, supported by attacks from the besieged military area in central Omdurman.
Relieving the siege would give the army a substantial morale boost and help restore flagging public confidence, while also forcing the RSF to cede substantial territory—or risk being surrounded themselves—including the historic neighborhoods of Beit al-Mal and Al-Mulazimin, home of Sudan Radio and TV, among other landmarks. However, the RSF would still be left in control of western and southern parts of Omdurman, and the sprawling outskirts of Ombada and Salha.
A previous offensive by the army in August was short-lived and unsuccessful. At that time, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) consistently demonstrated superior tactics and higher morale. But six months of attrition warfare have worn down the RSF’s defenses, while giving the army valuable combat experience.
The Armed Forces also have deployed some of their best troops in Omdurman, even as the RSF shifted their focus elsewhere. The frontline units include the intelligence authority’s Operations Authority, the 9th Airborne Division, elements of the Central Reserve Police, and the Al-Baraa Ibn Malik Brigade, which is an Islamist armed group operating alongside the army with the implicit blessing of the SAF leadership.
Other advantages include superior manpower, superior logistics, attack drones, a limited number of armored vehicles, and a more reliable system of pay and benefits.
Furthermore, the destruction of the Shambat Bridge in November—a presumed act of sabotage—cut off Omdurman from Bahri, making it harder for RSF troops in different parts of the capital region to reinforce each other. (RSF opened an alternative route when they captured the Jebel Aulia dam bridge, but this is a longer journey).
This battle is being waged in part in commercial and industrial areas that civilians long ago abandoned. Civilians have fled en masse from the affected neighborhoods, and those that remain generally don’t have electricity. That makes open-source analysis one of the only effective tools for understanding the progress of the battle, relying on videos filmed by the combatants themselves.
Based on the based of the pace of the army’s gains, they could soon succeed in opening up a corridor to the besieged area, which includes the Corps of Engineers, military hospital, Nimeiri Military college, and several neighborhoods around it.
But the army has advanced in Omdurman before, only to lose its gains in subsequent RSF counter-attacks. The RSF might send reinforcements that would make the final stage of the offensive more difficult than the first. Another risk is that they capture only a narrow corridor, which would be vulnerable to attacks, such as the ambush of a large supply convoy in Bahri in July, which wiped out the entire convoy.
The army have captured a number of tall buildings along their route, providing strongpoints to help guard against RSF counter-attacks.
Here is an example of one of the videos that we analyzed in order to produce the map above. The video shows SAF troops at the Awlad Shendi building in the Omdurman market, with captured fuel jerrycans. This is the farthest point south that they have advanced along the north-to-south axis of advance, as far as we are aware.
What happens if they relieve the siege?
Pro-army propagandists have exaggerated the army’s recent gains in Omdurman, claiming that they are on the verge of capturing the city as a whole. However, merely relieving this besieged area will not necessarily end the Battle of Omdurman.
The RSF could be difficult to dislodge from a warehouse and commercial district just west of this corridor, and they could retreat into southern and western neighborhoods that they still control, including Al Arda, Ombada, Salha, and Abu Seid. An army victory in central Omdurman would risk pushing fighting into these outlying residential areas, putting millions more civilians at risk of shelling and displacement.
Nevertheless, the end of combat in Old Omdurman could free up thousands of troops of both sides who could be redeployed elsewhere. For the army, for example, Khartoum Bahri might be the next priority for the army.
For the RSF, defeat on the Omdurman front would represent their first major setback of the war, and could prompt them to counter-attack elsewhere in order to regain the initiative and bolster the morale of their troops.
The Omdurman front is the only area in Sudan where the Armed Forces have carried out a sustained offensive operation. Lessons learned in Omdurman could be applied to the next phases of combat in other parts of the capital region.
The army’s recent progress has given supporters high hopes that the tide of the war is turning. Commander-in-Chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in a speech last week called the current military phase “the beginning of the end” of the RSF.
Similarly, Major General Walid Abdelgader Ajabna, commander of the 9th Airborne Division, which is based in northern Omdurman and Wadi Saidna, said in speech,
“The previous period was defensive operations. People were defending, and protecting the basecamps. Now the Armed Forces have begun to launch offensive operations and achievements have begun, achievement after achievement, and now we have taken most of Old Omdurman… and the enemy was forced to dig with the excavator because he began to defend. We say to him stay and defend your place, and we will come to you, God willing.”
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