Military outlook: What to expect from dry season fighting in Sudan
Risks of escalation in west, central, and southeastern Sudan
ANALYSIS
A three-month period of seasonal rains is coming to an end in Sudan, heralding the beginning of a potentially vicious new phase of the nation’s civil war.
The rains turned parts of the countryside to mud and flooded seasonal rivers (wadis), hampering off-road movement. This resulted in a lull in combat activity since July, except in urban areas. As the earth dries, the fighting is set to pick up.
In this article, we assess the likelihood of escalation in different parts of the country, outlining various scenarios.
Last year, the beginning of the dry season (October to December) coincided with significant battles in Nyala, Zalingei, Balila, Jebel Aulia, El Geneina (Ardamata), and Wad Madani—all resulting in victories for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
The paramilitary, which began fighting the Sudanese military in April 2023, emerged from the ‘Janjaweed’ Arab militias that slaughtered civilians in Darfur in the early 2000s, during counter-insurgency operations ordered by the former regime. Having dominated the western Darfur region for many years now, they have set their sights on national rule, claiming to be liberators and supporters of democracy.
After 17 months of fighting, the RSF now controls a territory about the size of Sweden or Iraq, not counting vast northern desert regions through which they are able to move freely. Their control stretches from the Chadian border in the west to Khartoum in the center, and to the Ethiopian border at Dinder National Park in the southeast.
Meanwhile, Sudan’s military, led by generals of the former dictator, Omar al-Bashir, has retreated to Port Sudan, having lost control over most of the capital. Convinced that new weapons and recruits eventually will turn the tide of the war, they have boycotted ceasefire talks sponsored by the United States, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.
Overall outlook
During the coming dry season, we anticipate that fighting will intensify along existing frontlines, while potentially spreading to new areas as one or both sides launch new offensives. We anticipate further mass displacement of between 200,000 and 2 million civilians, depending on the scenario. El Fasher alone could generate another 200,000 displaced.
In terms of military outcomes, we think there is a low probability that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) will gain the upper hand, a low to medium probability of a stalemate, and a medium to high probability of further gains by the RSF.
The RSF maintain the initiative following the successful invasion of Sennar State just before the rainy season, and they have yet to lose a major battle to the SAF, though they have suffered substantial losses in Omdurman and El Fasher. To change the tide of war, the Sudanese military will need to win one or more decisive battles, and to do that they must find ways to negate the RSF’s substantial maneuver advantage. To date, we have yet to see any evidence of a trend in that direction.
Our analysis is based on our tracking of territorial control, general disposition of forces, past and ongoing combat performance and trends, and political and geographic factors affecting local and national military dynamics.
Sennar City
There is a large concentration of RSF troops around Sennar City, the only city in Sennar State still under the army’s control. Fighting recently took place in villages near the city, which is surrounded on three sides. An RSF breakthrough into the urban core could trigger a collapse of SAF’s defenses, as happened during previous assaults against the cities of Wad Madani, Sinja, and Jebel Aulia.
Alternative scenarios include prolonged urban combat, a prolonged siege, or a SAF counter-offensive. For SAF, the strategic priorities are to maintain the road link between Sennar and Gedaref, and eventually to reopen the Rabak-Sennar Road.
Gedaref
The army has built up forces around Al-Fau and the state capital, anticipating an offensive to recapture the Jazira state capital, Wad Madani. SAF and allied troops launched tentative attacks into Jazira earlier this year. This has made the Gedaref-Jazira border an active frontline since December 2023, with SAF on the offensive.
However, the RSF takeover of Sennar State in June has extended the Gedaref Front by more than 100 km, imperiling Gedaref itself from both the west and south. Military authorities have scrambled to build up a new defensive line along the Rahad River Valley, facing toward RSF troops that have arrived recently in the Dinder Valley. Specific hotspots include the Dinder-Hawata road and the plain between Sennar and Al-Fau, which the army needs to control to prevent Sennar from being surrounded.
Gedaref is an agricultural state with wide open plans, crisscrossed by rivers and irrigation canals. This terrain favors the RSF, and the state is vulnerable to incursions.
Khartoum
The RSF dominates the capital while the SAF controls just two small enclaves, including the University of Khartoum, parts of the now gutted downtown, the Armed Forces headquarters, and a few residential neighborhoods in the city’s southeast. Fighting in these dense urban areas is static and mostly stalemated.
We foresee two possible scenarios for Khartoum. The first involves a concerted effort by the RSF to overrun the remaining SAF resistance. This would give them full control of the capital, which they might perceive as being strategically and politically beneficial. However, the RSF have attempted such attacks before and an offensive in dense urban terrain would be very costly, slow, and risky.
Therefore this scenario is unlikely and the more likely scenario is a continuing stalemate. Low-level fighting will continue in small areas of Khartoum, involving occasional skirmishes, sniping, shelling, airstrikes, and drone attacks.
Omdurman
By contrast, the army are substantially stronger in Khartoum’s twin city, Omdurman, where they made a breakthrough in February this year, capturing key RSF-controlled areas. There is a greater likelihood of intense fighting in Omdurman and neighboring Ombada, which would affect large numbers of civilians.
Depending on the SAF’s priorities, they may try to extend their control in Omdurman. We anticipate a stalemate or limited SAF advances on this front.
Bahri (Khartoum North)
Earlier this year, we warned of a likely a SAF offensive into Khartoum Bahri. However, this anticipated offensive has not materialized, and the situation has now changed.
Two pockets of SAF resistance remain in the city—around the Kober Prison in the south, and in the northern suburbs, in an area that we have called the “Kadroo Enclave.” Fighting around these areas is likely to continue. There is a high probability of some kind of stalemate, a low to medium probability of an RSF takeover of one or more of these enclaves, and a low probability of a successful SAF breakout.
SAF could still attempt to relieve these enclaves from neighboring River Nile State, but the partial destruction of Halfaya Bridge, failed incursions across the state border, and SAF setbacks on other fronts make it harder now to envision an offensive into Bahri.
River Nile
There is a high risk of escalation along the border between Khartoum State and River Nile State, though it will be difficult for either side to achieve a breakthrough on this front.
River Nile is the home state of Omar al-Bashir and Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and a stronghold of the regime. SAF have built up a large force in the state, which could attack southward toward the Jaili Refinery or Khartoum Bahri.
However, previous SAF attempts to advance on this axis were defeated, and the SAF may avoid committing forces to a new offensive for fear of being outflanked and attacked in their rear. The RSF have sent reconnaissance teams into River Nile, and they consider Shendi a strategic prize, as it is the symbolic home of Ja’alin, the tribe of many top military brass and many politicians of the current and former regimes.
The RSF could attack Shendi to preempt an army offensive into Khartoum State and to humiliate the Ja’alin. Such an attack would likely meet fierce resistance. We assess that there is a low probability of a full-scale offensive by either party but a medium to high probability of border clashes. In the longer term, there is a higher risk of large-scale operations along this front.
Darfur
Fighting in the North Darfur capital of El Fasher continued throughout the rainy season, causing hundreds of civilian deaths due to shelling and crossfire. Combined with the effects of an ongoing famine and the daily military casualties, this has made El Fasher the deadliest place in Sudan currently.
It is the only city in Darfur still under SAF control, and the RSF offensive has been relentless, despite a UN Security Council resolution demanding de-escalation in this city. The RSF’s latest advances have brought them into the city center and close to the headquarters of the 6th Infantry Division. Despite this, victory is far from certain. The RSF’s offensive is hampered by the large size of the defending force in El Fasher, which includes not only army troops but also allied ex-rebel movements.
Presently, the Darfur movements are mobilizing in other parts of Darfur, Chad, and in newly established training camps in eastern and northern Sudan. These troops eventually could relieve the siege of El Fasher or attack other areas of North Darfur to draw away RSF troops. We think there is a high probability that fighting will continue in El Fasher, and a high probability that it will extend to other parts of North Darfur.
The chances of escalation in other parts of Darfur are lower, due to the RSF’s dominance throughout the region. However, the Sudanese Air Force has indiscriminately bombed RSF-controlled cities, and they could continue to do so, despite achieving minimal if any military gain from these airstrikes.
Managil
The small city of Managil, located 60 km west of Wad Madani, is the only SAF-controlled city in Jazira State. Though the city is mostly cut off from SAF troops elsewhere, and thus poses no significant threat to the RSF, it is a thorn in the side of the paramilitary, hindering their control over the vast agricultural state.
The Sudanese army and intelligence services have used Managil to launch raids into neighboring areas and to try to incite villagers in RSF-controlled areas to revolt against the RSF.
The chances of fighting around Managil are high. Either the RSF will try to seize the city, or the SAF will continue using it to undermine RSF control in Jazira State, in which case more raiding and insurgent operations are expected.
North Kordofan
The RSF move freely throughout North Kordofan, except for the SAF-controlled city of El Obeid. Occasional fighting has taken place around El Obeid and inside the city, but we don’t foresee any imminent effort by the RSF to capture El Obeid.
Attacking El Obeid would inflame relations with the tribes of North Kordofan, imperiling the RSF’s supply route between the Nile Valley and their stronghold in Darfur. Instead, the RSF will seek to contain the SAF to El Obeid while maintaining a loose siege of the city. There are indications that they have struck deals with El Obeid notables and traders to allow continued commercial deliveries to and from the region.
West Kordofan
This is one of the few states where de-escalation is possible, perhaps even likely. The last dry season witnessed significant fighting in several parts of West Kordofan, but since then the RSF have consolidated their control over most of the state and they may seek to avoid further confrontations, due to local political considerations.
Fighting could persist in Babanusa, where the remnants of the 22nd Infantry Division are under siege, and in the northern localities of the state, where Hamar tribesmen have resisted RSF incursions, rallying in support of a small SAF garrison in An-Nahud.
Escalation is also possible around Heglig, which the SAF still control, though the RSF may avoid attacking this area to avoid provoking the Chinese government, which has an interest in the oilfield there. South Sudan, which controls part of the Heglig oilfield, may also discourage RSF attacks toward this southeastern corner of the state.
South Kordofan
The Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan are mostly controlled by the SPLM-North, which is neutral in the war between SAF and RSF, though they took advantage of SAF weakness earlier in the war.
Recent high-level talks between the Sudanese military and the SPLM-North, and friendly relations between Sudan and South Sudan (which is a long-time ally of the SPLM-North), limit the likelihood of escalation in this region. Additionally, the RSF has few troops in South Kordofan, which makes widespread fighting unlikely.
One exception is the city of Dilling, which is a potential flashpoint due to its demographics and its proximity to RSF units in North and West Kordofan. Last year, fighting in this city brought the SPLM-North into direct conflict with the RSF. However, localized fighting in Dilling would likely not draw the SPLM-N into the wider war, unless the higher-level political situation changed.
A de facto truce may prevail throughout the region. The city of Kadugli, which hosts the strongest SAF garrison in South Kordofan, is another a potential flashpoint, but only if relations deteriorate between SAF and SPLM-North.
White Nile
The RSF control about 2,500 square kilometers in the northern part of White Nile, but none of the major cities. The rest of the state is still firmly under SAF control but is particularly vulnerable to assault after the fall of Sennar State to the east. The two states share a border of 180 km. Fighting has taken place in the Jebel Dud area (“Jebel Moya axis”) along the Rabak-Sennar road, near the state border. Additionally, a convoy of RSF combat vehicles was seen at Jebel Sarjayn, 65-70 km east of Rabak.
White Nile also shares a border of more than 300 km with RSF-controlled North Kordofan, as well as a border with RSF-controlled parts of Khartoum State.
These geographic factors make it difficult for SAF, as defender, to predict the direction of an attack. The Sudanese army, which typically fights from static defensive positions, will be at a considerable disadvantage if the RSF attack White Nile State.
An attack by the RSF on White Nile State could send tens or hundreds of thousands of people fleeing south toward Renk County in the Republic of South Sudan, which broke away from Sudan in 2011.
There is a medium to high probability of fighting in White Nile State. In a video circulated by pro-RSF social media accounts in July, the top RSF field commander on the west bank of the White Nile, Ahmed Sheikh Kabar, boasted that the paramilitary would soon take over the state. “God willing, sooner rather than later, White Nile State will be ours,” he said. “Soon I will sit in the headquarters of the 18th Division in Kosti.”
Blue Nile
Occasional fighting has already taken place along the border between Sennar State and Blue Nile State, and this frontline is likely to remain active. However, this area typically enjoys more rainfall than the rest of Sudan, so the ground may not dry fully until the end of November, limiting fighting for the time being.
Damazin, the capital of the state, is headquarters of the 4th Infantry Division and also the political power base of Malik Agar, deputy chairman of the Sovereignty Council and a former rebel leader, whose SPLA-North troops are now integrated with SAF.
The state is populous and seemingly well defended, and the SAF-SPLA alliance limits the chances of a successful RSF takeover of the state—though this won’t necessarily stop them from trying. Among the prominent RSF commanders is one native of Blue Nile, Mak Ebaid Hussain Abu Shotal, whom the RSF may seek to install as governor.
In a video posted on official RSF social media accounts in July, Abu Shotal issued an ultimatum, calling on Blue Nile authorities to surrender the state without fighting. “We want to take over your country [region], then we will go somewhere else,” he said.
Further complicating the situation in Blue Nile, local militias are active in some rural areas, as well as the SPLM faction led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, which controls the Yabus area in the southeastern corner of the state. These dynamics further reduce the likelihood of a full RSF takeover of the state.
Blue Nile State contains the Roseires Dam, which plays a crucial role in regulating water flow to Egypt downstream. Any attack by the RSF on the state would amplify the concerns of Sudan’s neighbors, particularly Egypt, but also Ethiopia and South Sudan, due to the risk of major refugee flows and conflict spillover.
The ‘safe’ states
As the war progresses, we anticipate that the RSF will use their mobility advantage to strike farther afield, widening the scope of the war into previously unaffected areas. The RSF’s successful invasions of Sennar and Jazira could lead them to believe that other rear areas are equally vulnerable.
For example, an attack into Northern State is feasible. At the start of the current war, the RSF carried out a long-range raid from Khartoum to Merowe, traveling about 500 km across the desert. They destroyed fighter jets at the Merowe Airport and captured a contingent of Egyptian troops, before withdrawing from the city.
Equally, a raid into western Kassala State is possible, though not necessarily likely. Eventually, even Red Sea State could be vulnerable.
Such attacks would not necessarily result in permanent control of these regions by the RSF, but they would fulfill a larger strategic objective, namely, undermining the legitimacy and confidence of the government in Port Sudan and shifting the war away from the RSF’s homeland in the west into Sudan’s eastern regions.
The typical RSF combat vehicle is a light pickup truck, often modified to carry a heavy machine gun, cannon, or anti-aircraft gun. A convoy of these off-road vehicles can travel several hundred kilometers per day, depending on the terrain.
To neutralize this long-range threat, the SAF would need to substantially improve their Air Force, their reconnaissance and intelligence capabilities, and their own capacity for long-range maneuver operations. Until that happens, SAF will not be able to ensure the safety of the cities it controls, even those that are far from the battlefield.
Sudan’s civil war is now in its 17th month. Without a ceasefire and a political process for resolving the conflict, the fighting could continue for a long time. The coming dry season fighting will reveal if the trend of RSF victories continues, or if SAF can begin to turn the tide.
Disclaimer
This article contains forward-looking statements regarding military events and their potential outcomes. We are analyzing the situation as best we can based on available information; however, we cannot guarantee the accuracy of our predictions. Actual developments may differ significantly due to a variety of factors, including geopolitical changes, operational decisions, and unforeseen circumstances. Readers should consider these uncertainties when interpreting the analysis presented herein.
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