Think tank warns of disaster risk in eastern Chad
Spillover into Chad is nearing one million refugees
A new report by the International Crisis Group warns that the war in Sudan could destabilize neighboring Chad, particularly the eastern Wadai region, which is hosting a vast refugee population from Darfur.
Last week Sudan and Chad traded accusations of supporting rebels in each other’s territory. Sudan’s justice minister said Sudan lodged a complaint against Chad at the African Union for supporting the Rapid Support Forces. Soon thereafter, Chad’s Foreign minister issued a press release saying, “Sudan is financing and arming terrorist groups operating in the sub-region with the aim of destabilizing Chad.”
While adding few specifics, he mentioned FACT (Front pour l'Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad), the rebel group which killed the former president Idriss Deby Itno in a battle in 2021, which received support from the Sudanese government.
Viewed by Western nations as one of the few bulwarks in the Sahel against jihadist insurgencies, Chad is vulnerable to massive socioeconomic pressures caused by Sudan’s war, as well as significant political and military risks.
Furthermore, eastern Chad is the scene of a major humanitarian disaster, which is likely to worsen. Since last year Chad has received more than 930,000 people from neighboring Sudan. Approximately 90% of those arrivals are women and children.
International Crisis Group says that humanitarian aid in the region is already insufficient and that a further wave of refugees will overwhelm the capacities of humanitarian organizations while donors are already struggling to fund the current response plan. The Brussels-based think tank wrote in a report November 14,
“The escalation of the war in Sudan could weaken Chad, which is one of the few islands of stability in the Sahel region increasingly beset by political and security crises…
“A new wave of refugees and returnees in Wadai will further strain the sharing of the province's meager resources… While a political solution to the war in Sudan now seems unlikely in the short term, the refugees risk remaining in Chad for several years, even decades, like those who arrived during the 2003 crisis. Faced with unemployment and poverty, a growing number of them, particularly young men, could be tempted to leave to look for work in the Tibesti province, in Libya or in Europe.
“At the same time, the ethnicization of the conflict in Darfur is increasing anti-Arab sentiment in Ouaddaï, raising fears of new inter-communal clashes, like those that shook the province in 2019. Newcomers, traumatized by the atrocities committed by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan, are importing new grievances against the Arab community, which are fueling the prejudices of Ouaddaïans.”
Risks of interstate conflict and civil war
In addition to the risk of local conflict in Wadai, the think tank warned of a potential crisis at the heart of the regime, as well as interstate conflict with Sudan. Diplomatically, President Mahamat Déby “faces a perilous balancing act,” the report says. While his regime has proclaimed itself neutral since the conflict began, business deals he made with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) call into question that neutrality.
The UAE are the principal international sponsor of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the renegade paramilitary battling to overthrow the Sudanese government.
Crisis Group reported that Déby and his inner circle gave “tacit consent” for the UAE to supply the RSF with weapons and equipment from Chad, noting that Emirati cargo planes have landed regularly in Chad, both in Admjarass in the east and in the capital N’Djamina. “The weapons are then transported to Darfur by road, as established in the report of the UN Panel of Experts on Sudan.”
“The agreements with the UAE weaken President Mahamat Déby's position in the Zaghawa community – from which he comes, like his father – but also allow him to consolidate his power at the head of the country. On the one hand, Emirati support for the RSF, which regularly attacks non-Arab communities in Darfur, including the Sudanese Zaghawa, is resented by certain segments of this community in Chad. This discontent has grown since the start of the siege of El-Fasher, which has a large Zaghawa population and whose elites maintain close ties with the Chadian presidential family.”
“On the other hand, the funding granted in 2023 by the UAE, which represents more than 80 percent of the Chadian state budget, contributes to perpetuating a clientelist policy. It would seem to have allowed President Mahamat Déby to buy the silence of Chadian Zaghawa critical of the UAE, but also to appoint several nationals of other northern communities, in particular the Goran, to positions of responsibility created for the occasion, thus broadening his support base.”
“Despite President Mahamat Déby's efforts to balance the situation, these tensions have already led to a few incidents within the army, such as defections and disagreements between Arab and Zaghawa officers.
In a footnote, citing telephone interviews with security sources in October 2024, Crisis Group notes that “around a thousand soldiers are believed to have defected [from the Chadian army].” This finding aligns with our previous reporting about desertions from the Chadian army as soldiers joined the Joint Force in Darfur.
International Crisis Group made several recommendations to various stakeholders, including international institutions, donor countries, and the Chadian government:
Chad’s government should keep the border with Sudan open to refugees but take measures to restrict the flow of fighters and weapons into Sudan.
Donors should honour their pledges to bolster the humanitarian response.
Chad’s government and international institutions should make efforts to improve the socioeconomic situation in the Wadai Region.
Chad’s government should take steps to address mounting anti-Arab sentiment and inter-communal tensions in Wadai by broadening the powers of local joint committees consisting of tribal leaders, local officials, and refugee leaders.
President Mahamat Déby “should finally correct his policy towards Sudan” by telling the UAE to stop supporting the RSF from Chadian territory. This step, among others, would ease local tensions in Wadai and could help restore diplomatic relations between N’Djamena and Port Sudan.
The report is available in French with a summary available in English.
In addition to the risk of conflict with Sudan, Chad faces a jihadist threat from Boko Haram insurgents in the Lake Chad region in the southwest. The insurgents attacked an army garrison in October, killing approximately 40 people. Subsequent operations against the insurgents resulted in at least 17 more deaths of Chaidan soldiers.
Below is a video of a self-professed jihadist arrested by Chadian soldiers during recent operation, which circulated widely among Sudanese and Chadians on social media over the weekend. Although the prisoner denies being Boko Haram, he says, “The infidels [should] have nothing to do with Chad. We are Muslims.” He is asked how many people he has killed; he denies killing anyone but replies that he wants to kill non-believers: “I did not kill even one infidel, but I want to kill.”
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Poet detained on dubious espionage charges
Intelligence operatives from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have detained prominent poet and media personality Mohamed Kheir Ikleel in Gedaref State over allegations of collaborating with the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Family members and close associates of Ikleel have strongly denied these allegations.
The poet’s arrest sparked concern over ethnic profiling and military repression.
Ikleel went missing on Monday after leaving his residence in the capital, Gedaref. His whereabouts remained unknown until Thursday, when a detained journalist informed a visiting relative that Ikleel was being held in the same facility on charges of espionage for the RSF, according to a friend.
Prominent poet and critic Hassan Abdelaziz confirmed to Sudan War Monitor that Ikleel is “in good health” and that a group of friends, accompanied by several members of his family, were allowed to visit him in the detention center. Abdelaziz said they urged the authorities in Gadaref state to conduct a fair investigation into the circumstances of his detention and the espionage charges against him.
“They have disclosed and admitted that they are, in fact, detaining him. This gesture reflects positively on the security authorities and their intentions. We trust the integrity of our friend and the justice of the authorities. We are hopeful he will be released soon after inquiries are completed regarding the claims that he is being held on espionage charges for the rebellion. We have made it very clear to the authorities that they must conduct the investigation in a fair manner, and we trust the authorities,” he said.
Close friends of Ikleel described the charges against him as fabricated, alleging that they were based on ethnic profiling. Darfuris, particularly those residing in eastern Sudan, and other marginalized groups, like the Nuba people, have frequently been targeted by security forces under the pretext of affiliation with the RSF.
This paranoia, fueled by the belief in RSF “sleeper cells” operating in the region, has led to the arbitrary detention and harassment of numerous individuals from these communities.
“He disappeared after arriving in Gedaref last Monday. On Thursday, security officials confirmed that Mohamed was being detained on suspicion of collaborating with the RSF, which is entirely untrue. His village is under SAF control, making such claims baseless,” a friend of Ikleel, speaking anonymously for security reasons, told Sudan War Monitor.
Ikleel is a graduate of the International University of Africa in Omdurman and is widely respected as a mentor in Sudan’s cultural circles. He hails from the Bargo tribe in Darfur, but his family has lived in central Sudan, specifically in the village of Shashina in Al-Suki Locality, Sennar State.
He was forced to relocate to Gedaref state in July following RSF advances and the subsequent capture of Sinja, the state capital, and surrounding areas, including Al-Suki. Shashina is a small village six miles south of Al-Suki town and was also under the control of the RSF until the SAF recaptured it last month.
Crackdowns on intellectuals—including lawyers, journalists, opposition politicians, and artists—have reignited fears over the Sudanese military intelligence’s expanding powers, drawing comparisons to tactics used during the Islamist-dominated regime of former President Omar al-Bashir.
Observers have warned that the military’s increasing surveillance and detention powers risk undermining freedoms under the guise of national security. In May, Sudan’s de facto military-led government passed the General Intelligence Service (GIS) Law (2024 Amendment), granting the intelligence service sweeping powers, including the authority to detain suspects, conduct surveillance, and seize assets.
The law also provides extensive immunity to intelligence personnel, shielding them from criminal or civil prosecution without approval from the agency’s director.
News in brief
U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan Tom Perriello is due to arrive in Port Sudan on Monday for a one-day visit. The state-run Sudan News Agency reported that Perriello, whose visit was initially set for Sunday before postponement for Monday, will meet senior officials from the Transitional Sovereignty Council, including the foreign minister, Darfur Governor Minni Arko Minnawi, humanitarian officials, and members of the pro-SAF opposition.
Remnants of the SAF's 16th Infantry Division, formerly based in South Darfur, have arrived in Sennar to bolster the SAF's offensive against the RSF. The division reportedy aims to recapture Sinja, the state capital south of Sennar town, and then advance northward towards Al Jazira State.
A group of women and activists in Sudan's North Darfur narrowly escaped an airstrike on Thursday while participating in a women's health event, witnesses told Sudan War Monitor on Saturday. The aerial bombardment, which involved barrel bombs, occurred during a celebration marking the end of “Pink October” in the Kuma area, northeast of El Fasher. The event was organized to raise awareness of breast cancer.
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